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Note
CRISIS COMPOUNDED BY CONSTRAINT: HOW REGULATORY
INADEQUACIES IMPAIRED THE FED’S BAILOUT OF BEAR STEARNS
BRYAN J. ORTICELLI
This Note explores the failure of the investment bank Bear Stearns
within the context of the greater financial crisis that began in the summer
of 2007, largely as a result of the widespread collapse of the market for
subprime mortgage-backed securities. Specifically, this Note discusses in
detail the circumstances surrounding the fall of Bear Stearns, the
unprecedented measures taken by the Federal Reserve to avoid a
disorderly breakup of the firm, and the policy implications of the Fed’s
actions for the future of investment bank regulation. By devoting
particular attention to the Fed’s response to Bear Stearns’s liquidity crisis,
which peaked in March of 2008, this Note seeks to elaborate on the
statutory provisions utilized by the Fed in the “unusual and exigent”
situation presented by the Bear Stearns predicament. Moreover, drawing
on criticisms voiced by members of both the public and private sectors
regarding the inadequacies of the Fed’s regulatory resources during the
Bear Stearns crash, this Note considers potential reforms to federal
supervision of investment banks in the future. With the hope of better
understanding the government’s role in the ongoing financial dilemma,
this Note uses the Bear Stearns bailout as a template for increasing
dialogue on the issue of the government’s proper function during a free
market catastrophe.
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CRISIS COMPOUNDED BY CONSTRAINT: HOW REGULATORY
INADEQUACIES IMPAIRED THE FED’S BAILOUT OF BEAR STEARNS
BRYAN J. ORTICELLI*
As we continue to address current market stress, we must also examine
the appropriate policy responses.1
In other words, the regulation that we have didn’t work very well.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Long before American taxpayers became the proud owners of up to
$700 billion in Wall Street’s “toxic assets,”3 Uncle Sam was already taking
novel actions to rescue failing financial giants from their own balance
sheets.4 More specifically, in March 2008, nearly seven months prior to
“one of the largest-ever government interventions in the nation’s
economy,”5 the Federal Reserve (“Fed”) exercised emergency lending
authority to prevent an imminent failure of the investment bank, Bear
Stearns.6 In so doing, the Fed utilized a “Depression-era law”7 in its role
* Nova Southeastern University, Farquhar College of Arts & Sciences, B.S. 2007; University of
Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2010. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to
Professor Patricia McCoy for her guidance and inspiration of this Note. This Note is dedicated to my
parents for their unwavering support throughout my life. All errors contained herein are mine and mine
alone.
1
Henry M. Paulson, Fmr. Sec’y of the Treasury, Remarks to the National Press Club on
Recommendations from the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (Mar. 13, 2008),
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp872.htm.
2
Tyler Cowen, Too Few Regulations? No, Just Ineffective Ones, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, at
B7.
3
See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. § 115(a)(3) (2008)
(authorizing the Treasury to incur up to $700 billion in purchase costs of troubled mortgage-backed
securities and other assets).
4
See Michael Crittenden & Marshall Eckblad, Update: Fed Rescue of Bear Stearns Isn’t Like
Bailouts of Old, DOW JONES NEWS SERV., Mar. 14, 2008 (“When the Fed announced . . . it had
arranged short-term emergency financing for [Bear Stearns]—an unprecedented event, depending on
whom you ask—it sent a signal to the world’s investors that a failure at [Bear Stearns] could put
markets around the world at risk.”); see also David Fettig, The History of a Powerful Paragraph,
REGION, June 2008, at 33, available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/08-06/section13.pdf
(“When describing the Federal Reserve’s response to the Bear Stearns episode, observers have used
words like ‘extraordinary’ and ‘unprecedented.’”).
5
Greg Hitt & Deborah Solomon, Historic Bailout Passes as Economy Slips Further, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 4, 2008, at A1.
6
See Timothy F. Geithner, Fmr. President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Testimony Before the
U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs (Apr. 3, 2008), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2008/gei080403.html (explaining the necessity of
Fed intervention in the Bear Stearns financial crisis); Kate Kelly et al., Fed Races to Rescue Bear
Stearns in Bid to Steady Financial System—Storied Firm Sees Stock Plunge 47%; JP Morgan Steps In,
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8

as “lender of last resort” to avert the economic catastrophe that a
disorderly bankruptcy of Bear Stearns presented.9 Fearful of the systemic
risk posed by a sudden failure of an institution as large and interconnected
as Bear Stearns, proponents of the bailout justified its imposition given the
“unusual and exigent circumstances” involved.10 Moreover, with no
private sector solution readily apparent at the time, the Central Bank had
few options to choose from to protect the nation’s economy—a process
Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke argued was “severely complicated by the lack
of a clear statutory framework for dealing with such a situation.”11
The arcane framework criticized by Chairman Bernanke consists of
fragmented authority among a variety of agencies including, among others,
the Fed, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), who all play a role in
overseeing investment banks.12 Not surprisingly, this consortium of
WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2008, at A1 (“Credit turmoil spread to the heart of the U.S. financial system as
Bear Stearns Cos., an 85-year-old institution that has survived the Depression and two world wars,
sought and received emergency funding backed by the federal government.”). For a more detailed
discussion of the Fed’s utilization of emergency lending authority during the Bear Stearns crisis, see
infra Part III.A.–B. It should be noted at the outset that this Note’s continuous reference to “Bear
Stearns” is made with respect to the company as the nation’s fifth-largest investment bank as it existed
in March 2008. Benton Ives, Fed Dips into Bag of Liquidity Tricks, CQ WEEKLY, Mar. 17, 2008, at
684. Although The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. included numerous subsidiary institutions and
organizations, this Note is solely concerned with the operations of Bear Stearns as an investment bank.
Investment banks (i.e., nonbanks), unlike their commercial depository counterparts, function primarily
as financial intermediaries, and are subject to less regulatory oversight and standards than traditional
banks. See, e.g., Jose Gabilondo, Leveraged Liquidity: Bear Raids and Junk Loans in the New Credit
Market 10 (Fla. Int’l Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-01, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1141955 (“Nonbank lenders need not comply with federal limits on how much
the lender can leverage [or assume debt] itself.” (citation omitted)).
7
Greg Ip, Bear on the Brink: Desperate Fed Dusts Off Remedy from the Depression to Save
Bear—Opening the Discount Window for a Nonbank Requires Special Votes at Central Bank, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 15, 2008, at A9.
8
David Fettig, Lender of More than Last Resort, REGION, Dec. 2002, at 15–19, 44–47, available
at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/02-12/lender.pdf.
9
See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Forum on Mortgage Lending for Low and Moderate Income
Households (July 8, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke
20080708a.htm [hereinafter Bernanke, FDIC] (“[A]llowing Bear Stearns to fail so abruptly at a time
when the financial markets were already under considerable stress would likely have had extremely
adverse implications for the financial system and for the broader economy.”).
10
See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Testimony
Before the Joint Economics Committee (Apr. 2, 2008), available at http://federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/testimony/bernanke20080402a.htm (“With financial conditions fragile, the sudden failure
of Bear Stearns likely would have led to a chaotic unwinding of positions in [critical] markets and
could have severely shaken confidence.”); see also Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
11
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Annual Economic Symposium (Aug. 22, 2008), available at
http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080822a.htm [hereinafter Bernanke, Kansas
City].
12
See Regulatory Checks and Balances, CQ WEEKLY, Mar. 17, 2008, at 681, 681 (“A variety of
federal agencies oversee the nation’s financial institutions. In response to the sub-prime mortgage
crisis, the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets has proposed that many of those regulators
step up their oversight, particularly in regards to trading in mortgage-backed securities.”).
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government entities can result in gray areas of regulation, where seemingly
distinct oversight duties can overlap and lead to supervisory inconsistency,
or worse.13 For example, although Bear Stearns was primarily regulated by
the SEC as a securities firm, the Commission (unlike the Fed) does not
“have a checkbook to help inject money into an investment bank or market
when it hits trouble.”14 Conversely, during the Bear Stearns emergency,
the Fed lacked the extensive regulatory oversight of investment banks that
the SEC’s mandate provides15—oversight which may have preemptively
thwarted the need for an eventual $29 billion bailout.16
Concerns such as these have prompted intense review by members of
both the public and private sectors of existing financial regulation,
particularly as coordinated and implemented by the Fed over investment
banks.17 With immense changes to government policy already occurring,18

13
See Kara Scannell, The Bear Stearns Fallout: Crisis Highlights SEC’s Limits—Agency’s Lack
of Tools to Stem Financial Woes May Rekindle Debate, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2008, at A19 (“These
various [agencies] are all doing the same thing even if they’re called different things. It doesn’t allow
for the effective measurement of risk, the effective development of national policy. It’s just a
patchwork quilt that needs to be revised.” (quoting Harvey Pitt, former SEC Chairman)).
14
Id.; see also Kara Scannell, Credit Crisis: SEC Comes Under Criticism in Light of Bear Woes,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2008, at A6 (discussing the SEC’s limitations in times of financial crisis).
15
See Roger C. Altman, How the Fed Can Fix the World, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2008, at A25
(“[S]uddenly, the Fed was standing behind both the larger [commercial] banks it regulates and the
major investment banks it does not. This cannot continue.”). Despite the SEC’s broad ideological
regulatory mission, its efforts in actively overseeing diverse financial operations, including those of
hedge funds, have been the subject of ongoing scholarly criticism. See Thomas C. Pearson & Julia Lin
Pearson, Protecting Global Financial Market Stability and Integrity: Strengthening SEC Regulation of
Hedge Funds, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 48–60 (2007) (evaluating historical limitations on
the SEC’s oversight of hedge funds).
16
See Amit R. Paley & David Hilzenrath, SEC Chief Defends His Restraint; Cox Rebuffs
Criticism of Leadership During Crisis, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2008, at A1 (“The March collapse of
Bear Stearns illustrated an array of [SEC] shortcomings, according to a review by the SEC’s inspector
general. [The inspector general] concluded that [SEC] officials had been aware of ‘numerous potential
red flags’ at Bear Stearns ‘but did not take actions to limit these risk factors.’”); see also Kate Kelly,
The Fall of Bear Stearns: Bear Stearns Neared Collapse Twice in Frenzied Last Days—Paulson
Pushed Low-Ball Bid, Relented, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2008, at A1 (“To make [Bear’s bailout]
palatable to the Fed, J.P. Morgan assumed responsibility for the first $1 billion of any potential losses,
reducing the government’s exposure [in the bailout] to $29 billion.”).
17
See, e.g., Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, Financial Regulation in a System Context,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2008, at 2, 2–13, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2008_fall_bpea_papers/
2008_fall_bpea_morris_shin.pdf (“The most pressing policy question has been whether broker-dealers,
[including investment banks] should fall under banking regulation overseen by the Federal Reserve,
and if so how they should be regulated.”); see also Elizabeth F. Browne, The Tyranny of the Multitude
Is a Multiplied Tyranny: Is the United States Financial Regulatory Structure Undermining U.S.
Competitiveness?, 2 BROOKINGS J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 369, 376–410 (2008) (criticizing the
American financial regulatory structure as detrimental to global competition and providing empirical
analysis of derogatory effects within various financial markets); Ashok Vir Bhatia, New Landscape,
New Challenges: Structural Change and Regulation in the U.S. Financial Sector 17–19 (Int’l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. 07/195, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1007943 (discussing emerging policy considerations in the changing U.S. financial
markets).
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questions remain as to the proper scope of the Fed’s administrative
authority19—especially now that the financial landscape has altered such
that no major independent investment banks exist.20 As the Bear Stearns
incident suggests, effective government oversight directives can mean the
difference between preventing a crisis and using billions of dollars of
public funds to bail out private enterprises.21 However, as former Treasury
Secretary Henry Paulson has noted, regulation cannot “go so far as to . . .
make our markets less efficient,”22 or less competitive by stemming
innovation.23
Using the Bear Stearns case as a template, this Note explores the
criticisms regarding the regulatory structure of the American financial
industry with the goal of increasing dialogue as to the proper role of
government in the free market. By focusing on the unique circumstances
precipitating government action in avoiding the collapse of Bear Stearns,
this Note analyzes the legal tools relied on by the Fed to rescue Bear, and
how these tools may have been inadequate for the task at hand. Finally,
this Note draws on existing scholarly work to evaluate models of reform as
the economy continues to evolve.
Part II chronologically traces the factual developments leading up to
and including the Fed’s bailout of Bear Stearns. Discussion centers on the
early onset of the subprime mortgage crisis, initial effects of the crisis on
Bear Stearns’s ability to do business, and how Bear’s exposure to exotic
mortgage products eventually induced its demise. Part II also examines the
near bankruptcy of Bear and the Fed’s actions in forestalling this
occurrence, including facilitating the acquisition of Bear Stearns by
JPMorgan Chase (“JPMorgan”).
Part III considers the legal authority (pursuant to the Federal Reserve
Act) justifying the Fed’s actions in providing emergency funding to Bear
18
See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 2008, at A1 (“The S.E.C.’s oversight responsibilities will largely shift to the Federal Reserve,
though the commission will continue to oversee the brokerage units of investment banks.”).
19
See Bernanke, Kansas City, supra note 11 (“Going forward, a critical question for regulators
and supervisors is what their appropriate ‘field of vision’ should be.”).
20
See Jon Hilsenrath et al., Goldman, Morgan Scrap Wall Street Model, Become Banks in Bid to
Ride Out Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2008, at A1 (“It had become increasingly clear to Fed
officials . . . that the investment-banking model couldn’t function in these markets.”).
21
See Bernanke, Kansas City, supra note 11 (“The regulation and supervisory oversight of
financial institutions is another critical tool for limiting systemic risk. . . . A stronger [regulatory]
infrastructure would help to reduce systemic risk.”).
22
Paulson, supra note 1.
23
See Browne, supra note 17, at 376–410 (suggesting that disorganized government policy can
negatively affect the United States’ ability to compete for foreign investors in a variety of markets);
John T. Lynch, Credit Derivatives: Industry Initiative Supplants Need for Direct Regulatory
Intervention—A Model for the Future of U.S. Regulation?, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1371, 1423 (2008) (“An
increasingly heavy regulatory burden and a complex, cumbersome regulatory structure with overlaps at
the state and national levels is causing an increasing number of businesses to conduct more and more
transactions outside the country.” (citation omitted)).
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Stearns and arranging JPMorgan’s purchase of the company. Additionally,
Part III assesses the creation and revision of lending facilities operated by
the Fed following the Bear Stearns experience and how these facilities
contribute to the growing supervisory authority of the Central Bank.
Part IV analyzes criticism as to both the Fed’s apparently inadequate
ability to effectively manage the Bear Stearns situation and concerns that
have been voiced regarding the increasing omnipresence of government in
the free market. To bolster the contextual perspective of these competing
positions, comparisons will be drawn from diverse regulatory systems,
including those operative in foreign arenas, particularly the United
Kingdom.
Finally, Part V focuses on the principal issue of systemic risk in
evaluating the future of investment bank regulation, and how current
research on the topic may contribute to a new regulatory framework better
equipped at protecting the American (and global) economy. Part V also
reviews the state of the current financial markets in considering the need
for added regulation, while reflecting on the causes and implications of the
ongoing financial debacle.
II. THE TRAGEDY OF BEAR STEARNS
A. The Opening Act: July 2007–February 200824
Prior to the summer of 2007, “the world experienced an unusual mix of
financial conditions”25 that resulted in a dramatic growth of a variety of
consumer and financial markets, most notably the housing market and
subprime mortgage loan industry.26 Large investment banks sought to
capitalize on the boom in the housing market by not only buying

24
This subpart is intended to provide necessary background leading up to the Fed’s bailout of
Bear Stearns in March 2008. As such, brief consideration is paid to the onset of the subprime mortgage
crisis and the ensuing credit crisis within the financial markets, and how this phenomenon contributed
to Bear Stearns’ operational failure. However, full discussion of the causes and implications of the
mortgage and credit crises is beyond the scope of this Note.
25
Timothy F. Geithner, Fmr. President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the Council on
Foreign Relations Corporate Conference 2008: The Current Financial Challenges: Policy and
Regulatory Implications (Mar. 6, 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/
2008/gei080306.html [hereinafter Geithner, Foreign Relations].
26
See Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the Social
Capital Response, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 282–300 (2008) (providing a detailed account of the
growth and eventual collapse of the subprime mortgage market); see also A. Mechele Dickerson,
Consumer Over-Indebtedness: A U.S. Perspective, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 135, 139–44 (2008) (describing
the increase in mortgage lending and consumer debt assumption and noting how such factors
contributed to the onset of the mortgage crisis); Paul Mizen, The Credit Crunch of 2007–2008: A
Discussion of the Background, Market Reactions, and Policy Responses, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST.
LOUIS REV., Sept./Oct. 2008, at 531, 536, available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/
review/08/09/Mizen.pdf (“The market for subprime mortgages grew very fast.”).
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considerable stakes in subprime mortgage loans,
but also by
“securitizing” and pooling these loans into structured assets that would be
attractive to other investors based on anticipated return and risk exposure.28
These assets, known primarily as subprime mortgage-backed securities
(“MBS”) and collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”),29 were particularly
popular with two large hedge funds at Bear Stearns: the “High-Grade
Structured Credit Strategies Fund” and the “High-Grade Structured Credit
Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund.”30
Despite their initial appeal, subprime MBS and CDOs turned toxic
when the housing bubble burst starting in late 2006 and early 2007, and
extending into 2008.31 Large losses from these investments quickly
resulted in the evaporation of financing for private-label MBS,32 causing
loss of investor confidence and the subsequent failure of many subprime
lenders.33 As these problems continued to escalate in a vicious cycle
27
See Kenneth C. Johnston et al., The Subprime Morass: Past, Present, and Future, 12 N.C.
BANKING INST. 125, 130 (2008) (“[N]ever before had those on Wall Street been invested so heavily in
securities backed by subprime loans. . . . [T]hese investment vehicles became highly sought after by . . .
investment banks.”); Gretchen Morgenson, Rescue Me: A Fed Bailout Crosses a Line, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 2008, at B1 (“As of . . . Nov. 30, [2007,] Bear Stearns had on its books approximately $46
billion of mortgages [and] mortgaged-backed . . . securities.”).
28
See LUIGI SPAVENTA, CTR. FOR ECON. POL’Y RESEARCH, POLICY INSIGHT NO. 22, AVOIDING
DISORDERLY DELEVERAGING 1 (2008), available at http://www.cepr.org/pubs/PolicyInsights/
PolicyInsight22.pdf (“[B]anks would pool and securitize the [products] they originated to distribute
them and transfer their risks to a myriad of investors.”).
29
See Johnston et al., supra note 27, at 128–29 (discussing CDOs and MBS as types of
investments that derive their value from the repayment of loans by the initial home borrowers). To
make these investments marketable, investment firms would splice original loans into “tranches” to
reduce the risk of loss presented by a loan’s default. Id. Thus, investors could largely choose the type
of risk they were willing to accept based on the yield values of differing tranches. See Steven L.
Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 373, 375–79 (2008) (detailing the distribution of CDOs and MBS through unique schematic
processes).
30
These funds held “60% of their net worth . . . in exotic securities.” Matthew Goldstein & David
Henry, Bear Bets Wrong, BUS. WK., Oct. 22, 2007, at 50; see also Kate Kelly et al., Two Big Funds at
Bear Stearns Face Shutdown—As Rescue Plan Falters amid Subprime Woes, Merrill Asserts Claims,
WALL ST. J., June 20, 2007, at A1 (“[T]he two Bear Stearns hedge funds held more than $20 billion of
investments, mostly in complex securities made up of bonds backed by subprime mortgages . . . .”).
31
See Joe Nicer & Edmund L. Andrews, Running a Step Behind as a Crisis Raged, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 2008, at A1 (“The subprime mortgage debacle began emerging in the summer of 2007 . . . [b]ut
the true depth and extent of the losses did not become clear until [early in 2008] . . . .”); John Tatom,
The U.S. Foreclosure Crisis: A Two-Pronged Assault on the U.S. Economy 4–14 (Munich Personal
Repel Archive, Paper No. 9787, 2008), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9787/1/MPRA_
paper_9787.pdf (explaining how declines in the demand for housing and slowing in home appreciation
contributed to losses in mortgaged related investments).
32
See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, Testimony Before the Joint
Econ. Comm. (Sept. 24, 2008), available at http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/
bernanke20080924a.htm (“[F]alling home prices and rising mortgage delinquencies have led to major
losses at many financial institutions, losses only partially replaced by the raising of new capital.”).
33
See Frederic S. Mishkin, Governor of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, Speech to the Money
Marketeers of New York University: Outlook and Risks for the U.S. Economy (Sept. 10, 2007),
available at http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin20070910a.htm (“The rise in
delinquencies in the subprime market has led to the collapse of some large subprime lenders and
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throughout late 2007 and early 2008, consequences soon spread to Wall
Street and Bear Stearns, which in the summer of 2007 attempted to save
one of its hedge funds by injecting $1.6 billion into its reserves—
ultimately to no avail as both funds eventually lost all value.34
“By various accounts, the funds’ meltdown signaled the start of a
collapse in the vital element of trust that must exist between a firm like
Bear and its many customers.”35 This breakdown in trust would abruptly
evolve into a contagion, attacking the heart of Bear Stearns’s business
operations and bringing the eighty-five-year-old institution to its knees.36
For the fourth quarter of 2007, Bear reported a $2 billion write down in
mortgage securities,37 and posted its “first-ever quarterly loss” of $859
million.38
Unfortunately for the company, such losses would be
emblematic of Bear’s remaining existence as a going concern. Throughout
the rest of 2007 and into early 2008, Bear saw its stock value plummet,
client trust evaporate, and cohesion among its leadership unwind.39
B. The Perfect Storm: March 2008
To understand how Bear Stearns ultimately collapsed, it is first
important to explain Bear’s financing structure. As an investment bank,40
Bear relied on short-term (usually overnight) loans called repurchase
agreements (“repos”) to finance its daily activities and liquidity demands.41
inflicted substantial losses on holders of subprime [MBS] and of some . . . CDOs. . . . These
developments have contributed materially to the drop in demand for housing [in 2007].”).
34
See GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BEAR STEARNS: CRISIS AND “RESCUE” FOR A
MAJOR PROVIDER OF MORTGAGE-RELATED PRODUCTS 2, Mar. 19, 2008, available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34420_20080319.pdf (noting that soon after Bear’s loans to these
funds, “the funds lost all of their value and were allowed to wind down”).
35
Id.; see also Landon Thomas, Jr., Run on Big Wall St. Bank Spurs U.S.-Backed Rescue, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2008, at A1 (“The demise of the hedge funds began a slow but persistent loss of
market confidence in the bank . . . . Such erosion can be devastating for any investment bank,
especially one like Bear Stearns . . . .”).
36
See SHORTER, supra note 34, at 2 (noting that the initial breakdown in trust among Bear’s
customers would lead to unprecedented moves by the company to survive).
37
David Smith & Dominic Rushe, The Banking Twister Heading Your Way, SUNDAY TIMES
(London), Mar. 16, 2008, at B4 (“A month [after Bear attempted to save one of its hedge funds,] the
firm announced that the game was up for the funds, which had effectively lost all their value . . . .”).
38
SHORTER, supra note 34, at 2.
39
See Kate Kelly, The Fall of Bear Stearns: Lost Opportunities Haunt Final Days of Bear
Stearns—Executives Bickered Over Raising Cash, Cutting Mortgages, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2008, at
A1 (documenting internal developments at Bear Stearns following the failure of its hedge funds in the
summer of 2007 through January 2008).
40
Unlike commercial banks, investment banks do not take deposits from traditional individual
customers; rather, “[a]n investment bank’s activities” consist of “(1) managing an investment portfolio
. . . and (2) operating as a central market maker and counterparty” in financial markets. Dwight Jaffee
& Mark Perlow, Investment Banking Regulation After Bear Stearns, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Sept. 2008,
at 1, 1–2.
41
See Stephen A. Lumpkin, Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Agreements, in INSTRUMENTS
OF THE MONEY MARKETS 59, 60 (Timothy Q. Cook & Robert K. Laroche eds., 1993) (“[Repurchase]
agreements usually are arranged with short terms to maturity—overnight or a few days.”); Stephen G.
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Repos are secured by collateral (including MBS) that the borrowing
institution promises to buy back at a specified date and at a specified price,
“which typically includes interest at an agreed upon rate.”42 In essence,
because repos were vital to Bear’s daily operations, they left Bear at the
mercy of lender sentiment.43 Thus, when the subprime mortgage crisis
unfolded, lenders grew more fearful of entering into collateralized loans
with Bear given the firm’s large exposure to mortgage products.44 Instead,
lenders hoarded their liquidity, uncertain about the health of their own
balance sheets and those of their counterparties.45 “And it was the
[eventual] refusal of Bear’s repo lenders to extend overnight loans that
confirmed that Bear had a liquidity crisis [in mid-March 2008].”46
However, the growing failure of Bear to secure its vital repos in March
2008 was not the only factor that led to the firm’s “liquidity crisis.”47
While it may be said that Bear’s repo problems kept it from pulling money
in, Bear’s exposure to a variety of deteriorating assets led to losses that
eroded its already meager capital.48
For example, Bear, like other investment banks, initially appealed to
investor concerns of security by selling a type of insurance product along

Cecchetti, Crisis and Responses: The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008, at 10
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 14134, 2008), available at, http://www.nber.org/
papers/w14134.pdf (“Large financial institutions that hold various types of assets use repos to finance
their short-term liquidity needs—and those needs have grown astronomically.”). Amazingly, Bear
Stearns borrowed “more than 30 times the value of its $11 billion equity base,” amounting to a
“leverage ratio of over 30 to 1.” Thomas, supra note 35. To make matters more complicated, Bear
used large amounts of this borrowed money to invest in the same CDOs it was selling to other
investors. See Kelly et al., supra note 30 (“The problems can be exacerbated because many hedge
funds invest in CDOs with the help of borrowed money. To buy a triple-A rated CDO note for $1,000,
it is common for a hedge fund to put down only $100 of its own money . . . .”).
42
See Lumpkin, supra note 41, at 59, 62.
43
See Gabilondo, supra note 6, at 19 (“It was lender sentiment [in the repo market] that [Bear’s]
managers considered when evaluating the severity of the firm’s liquidity crisis.” (internal citation
omitted)).
44
See id. (“Anxious about market conditions, these lenders preferred to hoard liquidity rather than
to enter into collateralized loans.”). This phenomenon was symptomatic of the larger financial crisis in
which banks grew so fearful of lending to one another that access to available credit became very
difficult to secure. See Cecchetti, supra note 41, at 12 (“[T]he overriding consideration in the refusal of
banks to lend to one another must have become the concern over credit risk—that is, the risk that
borrowers would fail to repay.”).
45
See Randall S. Kroszner, Governor of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the Risk
Management Association Annual Risk Management Conference: Strategic Risk Management in an
Interconnected World (Oct. 20, 2008), available at http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
kroszner20081020a.htm (“Uncertainty about the value of assets and other exposures, as well as
uncertainty about the ability of institutions to sustain continued access to funding, has caused financial
institutions to operate with great caution and hoard funds.”).
46
Gabilondo, supra note 6, at 19.
47
Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York and Columbia Business School Conference on the Role of Money Markets (May
29, 2008), available at http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20080529a.htm.
48
See Geithner, supra note 6 (“The rumors of Bear’s failing financial health caused its balance of
unencumbered liquidity . . . to decline sharply . . . .”).
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49

with the MBS and CDOs Bear promoted. Known as credit default swaps
(“CDS”), these insurance contracts were marketed to investors as an
effective way to hedge risks associated with the default of underlying
mortgage loans.50 Essentially, CDS enabled investors in CDOs or MBS to
protect themselves in the event the underlying investment defaulted, by
paying a periodic fee in exchange for the promised contingency payment.51
Furthermore, even those investors who had not bought mortgaged-related
products could purchase CDS as a type of side bet that loans would default
and the investor would be paid the value of the CDS coverage.52 CDS
created systemic risk because the same investment banks that were selling
these contracts were also buying them from other financial guarantors to
secure the CDS they had sold.53 Because the CDS market was largely
unregulated,54 the aggregate amounts of these contracts skyrocketed to an
estimated total amount of $60 trillion,55 with Bear Stearns alone holding
roughly “$14.2 trillion of notional value in derivative contracts [including
CDS] outstanding with thousands of counterparties.”56
Ultimately, as mortgage loans defaulted in vast numbers, Bear’s CDS
liability was triggered. But there was one problem: “there was no money
49

See SHORTER, supra note 34, at 4.
See 60 Minutes: A Look at Wall Street’s Shadow Market (CBS television broadcast Oct. 5,
2008), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/10/05/60minutes/main4502454.shtml (“A
[CDS] was available [to investors], marketed to them as a risk-saving device for buying a risky
financial instrument.” (quoting Michael Greenberger, Prof. of Law, Univ. of Maryland)); see also
Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV.
1019, 1021 (2007) (“[A] credit default swap is a private contract in which private parties bet on a debt
issuer’s bankruptcy, default, or restructuring.”). As credit derivatives, CDS derive their value from an
underlying “price, rate, index, or financial instrument,” such as a MBS or CDO. David Mangle, Credit
Derivatives: An Overview, ECON. REV., Fourth Quarter 2007, at 1, available at http://www.frbatlanta.
org/filelegacydocs/erq407_mengle.pdf.
51
See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Systemic Risk and Regulation 4–5 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr.,
Working Paper No. 95-24, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=787797 (describing CDS arrangements).
52
See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 50, at 1022 (“Like other derivatives, credit default swaps can
be used not only for hedging, but also for speculation or arbitrage.”); 60 Minutes: Financial Weapons
of Mass Destruction (CBS Television broadcast Oct. 26, 2008), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2008/10/26/60minutes/main4546199.shtml?tag=currentVideoInfo;segmentUtilities
(“[CDS]
were essentially private insurance contracts that paid off if the investment went bad. But you didn’t
have to actually own the investment to collect on the insurance.”).
53
See Geithner, Foreign Relations, supra note 25 (“[O]n the assets they retained, these same
institutions purchased insurance from financial guarantors and other firms that were exposed to the
same risks.”).
54
See 60 Minutes, supra note 50 (discussing how CDS regulation had been lacking since 2000).
Following the stock market crash of 1907, state laws across the country made betting arrangements
(such as those embodied by CDS) a felony. Id. However, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act
of 2000 effectively removed the restrictions placed on these transactions. Id.; see also Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 7 U.S.C. § 27f(c) (2006) (preempting state regulation of CDS
transactions whose initial manifestation occurred in gambling houses known as “bucket shops”).
55
Jon Hilsenrath et al., Worst Crisis Since ‘30s, with No End Yet in Sight, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18,
2008, at A1.
56
Cecchetti, supra note 41, at 17. This figure is not totally comprised of CDS, as the firm also
held other types of derivative products, including futures and options. Id.
50
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57

behind the commitments.” The same institutions that had sold CDS were
not legally required to set aside the necessary cash to cover “their potential
losses.”58 Together with the defection of its hedge fund customers who
could easily withdraw their large deposits,59 the CDS losses suffered by
Bear helped set the stage for a classic run on the (investment) bank.60
Amid growing market anxiety, key counterparties began canceling their
investment and brokerage accounts with Bear,61 with “[s]ome [investors]
pulling their cash . . . for fear it could get locked up if there was a
bankruptcy.”62 As clients withdrew their business, Bear watched as its
credit dissolved, and it was only a matter of time before Bear’s problems
became a public concern.63
C. The Time of Reckoning
Bear’s access to and drain of liquidity continued to develop in early
2008. On March 10, “rumors began to circulate in the market that there
were significant liquidity problems at Bear Stearns itself.”64 These rumors
were then exacerbated by attempts to quell them, as Bear executives and
Moody’s Investors Service (“Moody’s”) both issued statements aimed at
reassuring investors that Bear was in good health, emphasizing the firm’s
large cash holdings of approximately $18 billion.65 Nonetheless, such
actions could not stop the intensifying “exit by counterparties” Bear was

57
60 Minutes, supra note 50. More precisely, CDS are traded as over-the-counter (“OTC”)
derivatives without strict regulatory oversight, and as such “contracts can be traded—or swapped—
from investor to investor without anyone overseeing the trades to ensure the buyer has the resources to
cover the losses if the security defaults.” Janet Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis?,
TIME, Mar. 17, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1723152,00.html.
58
60 Minutes, supra note 50.
59
See Morris & Shin, supra note 17, at 15.
60
See Bernanke, Kansas City, supra note 11 (“The collapse of Bear Stearns was triggered by a
run of its creditors and customers, analogous to the run of depositors on a commercial bank.”).
61
See Kate Kelly, SEC Will Scour Bear Trading Data—Documents Reveal Who Was Exiting
Deals in Final Days, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2008, at A1 (describing how several important investment
institutions sought to cancel their business connections with Bear in anticipation of the firm’s collapse).
The exit by counterparties actually increased market stress, as these parties struggled to find substitute
transaction avenues. See Serena Ng, Crisis on Wall Street: Credit-Default Market Freezes as Risk
Grows, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2008, at C3 (discussing how this phenomenon negatively affected
greater market confidence).
62
Kelly et al., supra note 6.
63
See Kate Kelly et al., In Dealing with Bear Stearns, Wall Street Plays Guardedly, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 13, 2008, at C1 (“Bear’s fundamental issue isn’t liquidity or capital as much as the erosion of its
business model as a result of the credit crunch.”).
64
JPMorgan Chase & Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEFM14A), at 27, (Apr. 28, 2008),
available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/692396293x0xS1193125-08-92860/777001/
filing.pdf.
65
See id. (“Moody’s clarified that . . . Bear Stearns’ . . . current ratings outlook was stable
[and] . . . Bear Stearns issued a press release denying the market rumors regarding its liquidity
position.”); Ruddy Boyd & Doris Burke, The Last Days of Bear Stearns, FORTUNE, Apr. 14, 2008, at
86.
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66

experiencing.
And “a number of U.S.-based fixed-income and stock
traders that had been actively involved with Bear . . . had reportedly
decided by March 10 to halt such involvement.”67
On Tuesday, March 11, investors continued to grow anxious over the
rumors, and ING Group NV, “a major asset-management company,”
stopped doing trades with Bear68—it was clear that “[c]redit was drying
up.”69 Again, in an effort to calm market fears, Bear Stearns executives
decided that President and CEO Alan Schwartz should address the public
live from a media conference in West Palm Beach, Florida.70 Mr.
Schwartz did so the next morning, appearing on CNBC and stating that
“we don’t see any pressure on our liquidity, let alone a liquidity crisis.”71
Meanwhile, “prime-brokerage clients continued to pull their money” from
Bear,72 “causing senior management . . . to become concerned that if these
circumstances accelerated Bear Stearns’s liquidity could be negatively
affected.”73 When Mr. Schwartz arrived back in New York late
Wednesday, March 12, he assembled “senior executives to discuss how to
save the firm.”74 But, his efforts would prove fruitless.
By Thursday, March 13, “market speculation had swelled” regarding
Bear’s access to credit and “[a]round 4:30 p.m., Mr. Schwartz was
convinced that Bear was facing a desperate situation.”75 Confronted with
the ongoing demands of clients and lenders to withdraw their money from
Bear, the firm had seen its liquidity reserves depleted to nearly $2 billion, a
loss of approximately $15 billion in four days.76 Frantic to find a solution,
Mr. Schwartz contacted Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase, in a bid
to negotiate a deal with the company, which had a long transactional
history with Bear Stearns.77 Mr. Dimon agreed to help, dispatching senior

66
See Kelly et al., supra note 6 (explaining the swift departure of customers that had previously
been willing to trade with Bear).
67
SHORTER, supra note 34, at 3.
68
Id.
69
Boyd & Burke, supra note 65.
70
See Kelly et al., supra note 6.
71
Interview by David Faber with Alan Schwartz, President & CEO, Bear Stearns, on CNBC:
First on CNBC (CNBC television broadcast Mar. 12, 2008), available at http://video.nytimes.com/
video/2008/03/14/business/1194817092072/bear-chief-firm-was-on-solid-ground.html.
72
Kate Kelly, The Fall of Bear Stearns: Fear, Rumors Touched Off Fatal Run on Bear Stearns,
WALL ST. J., May, 28, 2008, at A1.
73
JPMorgan Chase & Co., supra note 64, at 27.
74
Kelly, supra note 72.
75
William Sluis et al., Bailout of Wall Street Firm Shocks Markets; Federal Reserve Forced to
Save Company Squeezed by Mortgage Securities, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 15, 2008, at C1.
76
See Robin Sidel et al., The Week that Shook Wall Street: Inside the Demise of Bear Stearns,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2008, at A1 (“By [Thursday], Bear Stearns’s cash position had dwindled to just
$2 billion.”).
77
See Kelly, supra note 72 (describing how Schwartz contacted Dimon during his birthday party
and related to Dimon “[l]et’s do something”); see also Mizen, supra note 26, at 549 (noting that
JPMorgan Chase served effectively as Bear Stearns’s “banker”).
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JPMorgan traders to Bear to review the firm’s financial position.78 Upon
review, “[Dimon’s] group appeared stunned,”79 and it became apparent
later in the evening that Bear would not be able to secure unassisted private
financing from JPMorgan or any another institution.80 Bear’s directors
approved an emergency bankruptcy filing, and the firm’s corporate
counsel, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, began drafting necessary
documentation.81 Representatives from the SEC and the New York Fed,
which had been closely monitoring the situation, participated in a
conference call with members of the Board of Governors of the Fed and
the Treasury Department to discuss the implications of a Bear
bankruptcy.82 Chaotic discussions continued throughout the evening and
into the early morning, but no clear resolution was in sight.83
At 5 a.m. on Friday, March 14, Timothy Geithner (then-President and
CEO of the New York Fed) convened a conference call “with top
government officials” to rule on the fate of Bear Stearns.84 Recognizing
Bear’s highly complex interrelationships with thousands of counterparties,
and fearing that a failure of Bear could touch off a domino effect among
other institutions in similar market positions,85 “the Federal Reserve, in
close consultation with the Treasury Department, agreed to provide
funding to Bear Stearns through JPMorgan Chase.”86
Because Bear Stearns was an investment bank, it could not use its
collateral to gain a direct loan from the Fed’s “discount window,”87
necessitating the utilization of emergency lending authority.88 Although
technically the Fed did not lend directly to Bear, by providing the funds to
JPMorgan to then re-issue to the firm, the Fed itself assumed the risk of the
78
See Kelly, supra note 72; see also JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 28 (“Representatives of
JPMorgan Chase and officials from the U.S. Treasury Department, the New York Fed and the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System engaged in discussions regarding how to resolve the liquidity
deterioration at Bear Stearns.”).
79
Kelly, supra note 72.
80
See JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 28.
81
Kelly, supra note 72.
82
See Geithner, supra note 6.
83
See Sidel et al., supra note 76 (“‘It was a traumatic experience,’ says one person who
participated. Sleep deprivation set in, with some of the hundreds of attorneys and bankers sleeping
only a few hours . . . .”).
84
Kelly, supra note 72.
85
For example, “Bear risked defaulting on extensive ‘repo’ loans . . . . If that happened, other
securities dealers would see access to repo loans become more restrictive[,]” not to mention the fear
that would be set off in the CDS markets. Kelly et al., supra note 6.
86
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs (Apr. 3, 2008), available at http://federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/testimony/bernanke20080403a.htm.
87
For purposes of this Note, the discount window is best understood as a lending mechanism
which helps the central bank “ensure the basic stability of the payment system . . . by supplying
liquidity during times of systemic stress.”
The Federal Reserve Discount Window,
http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/discountwindowbook.cfm?hdrID=14&dtlID=43#introduction (last
visited Nov. 16, 2009).
88
See Cecchetti, supra note 41, at 17.
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89

loan. “By any measure, this action was extraordinary,” as the New York
Fed provided Bear with approximately $12.9 billion, a move not seen since
the Great Depression.90 The twenty-eight day government guarantee was
greeted with “high-fives” and cheers among Bear executives, who believed
that the term of the loan would allow them enough time to find a private
buyer for their firm.91 To the contrary, news of the loan was not nearly as
welcomed by Bear’s counterparties, or the market as a whole, as Friday
saw Bear’s common stock close down forty-seven percent, and the major
ratings agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch) drastically
downgraded Bear’s long- and short-term credit ratings.92 Based on these
developments, then-Secretary Paulson realized the loan was not a viable
solution and contacted Mr. Schwartz that same evening,93 informing the
CEO that the Fed-backed liquidity “would not be available on Monday
morning.”94 Suddenly, twenty-eight days became two, as Paulson told
Schwartz “[he] need[ed] to have a deal by Sunday night.”95 With most of
Bear’s customers and clients abandoning ship, there seemed to be only one
likely suitor: JPMorgan.
D. Shotgun Marriage Made in Heaven
Saturday morning, March 15, Mr. Schwartz together with senior
management of Bear Stearns met with their counterparts at JPMorgan and
J.C. Flowers & Co. (“JCFlowers”) to discuss the potential for mergers or
acquisitions.96 Throughout the day and into the evening, Bear’s leadership
attempted to negotiate a realistic proposal that could be finalized by late
Sunday evening before the open of Asian and European markets.97 At the
same time, Bear’s legal team again began to analyze potential bankruptcy
and/or liquidation scenarios, mindful of the limited protections available to
the firm under the United States Bankruptcy Code, as well as the
approaching Sunday deadline.98
Negotiations continued into early Sunday morning, March 16.
However, it soon became apparent that a purely private sector solution
would not be possible. JPMorgan reported that “it would need some level
of financial support from the New York Fed” to undertake a Bear Stearns
89

See Kelly et al., supra note 6.
Cecchetti, supra note 41, at 17.
See Sluis et al., supra note 75.
92
JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 28.
93
See Kelly, supra note 16.
94
JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 29.
95
Kelly, supra note 16.
96
JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 29.
97
See Kelly, supra note 16 (providing detailed documentation of the negotiations as they
unfolded on March 15).
98
See id. (noting that Bear’s status as a broker would present serious limitations and risks in any
type of bankruptcy filing).
90
91
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acquisition, and JCFlowers was having difficulty finding institutions to
finance any type of transaction with Bear Stearns.99 As such, officials
from the New York Fed were advised of the situation and “indicated that
[they] would be willing to consider the possibility of an arrangement that
would result in the New York Fed assuming some of the risk associated
with” a JPMorgan takeover.100 Initially, the Fed agreed to provide $30
billion of “non-recourse funding”101 to JPMorgan secured by collateral
consisting mainly of risky MBS and other assets that Bear owned.102 This
liquidity infusion would enable JPMorgan to acquire Bear and immediately
guarantee its outstanding debts to remaining counterparties and
customers—a vital factor in returning trust to the shaken global markets.103
Armed with this taxpayer-based guarantee, JPMorgan approached
Bear’s board of directors with a finalized stock merger agreement in which
Bear’s common stock would be exchanged for JPMorgan common stock
for $2 per share (the “original offer”).104 As a company that had a pershare value of approximately $171 in January 2007,105 the original offer
did not sit well with Bear’s board, which voiced its disagreement and
worried that acceptance would constitute a breach of their fiduciary duty to
stockholders.106 Nevertheless, the fear of imminent bankruptcy coupled
with the fact that no other solution was feasible (and increased pressure
from the government) led to an endorsement by Bear’s board of the
original offer, with the transaction announced in a joint press release
Sunday evening.107
Before the original offer could be presented to Bear’s shareholders for
99

JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 30.
Id. at 31.
A non-recourse loan is one in which the Fed would not be able to raise a legal claim against
JPMorgan in the event the loan was not repaid and the Fed lost money. See MARC LABONTE, CONG.
RES. SERV., FINANCIAL TURMOIL: FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY RESPONSES 7 (2008), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34427_20080407.pdf.
102
See JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 31.
103
See id. (“[B]ased on the New York Fed’s willingness to provide the $30 billion special funding
facility, JPMorgan Chase thought that it would be able to work towards negotiating a stock-for-stock
merger with Bear Stearns . . . with the need to guaranty certain obligations . . . effective immediately.”).
104
Id.
105
See Madlen Read & Joe Bel Bruno, Bear Stearns Shareholders OK Buyout by JPMorgan,
USA TODAY, May 29, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-05-29-3197519795_
x.htm.
106
See JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 31–32 (“Bear Stearns registered its objections to [the original
offer and] . . . [r]epresentatives of Bear Stearns’ legal advisors reviewed the fiduciary duties of the
board of directors, including the duties of directors if a company is insolvent or approaching
insolvency.”). Following the eventual endorsement of the merger, numerous “class action lawsuits
[were] filed against Bear Stearns, its board of directors and certain of Bear Stearns’ present and former
executive officers” alleging, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 48–49.
107
See id. at 33 (“[T]he Bear Stearns board of directors unanimously approved the agreement . . . .
Later that evening, JPMorgan Chase and Bear Stearns issued a joint press release announcing the
transaction.”); see also Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., The Short, Happy Death of Bear, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26,
2008, at A14 (“[The Fed] had plenty of legitimate clout, which it apparently used to virtually dictate the
original $2 share price.”).
100
101
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approval, “perceived deficiencies” and market reaction concerning the
merger’s closure would necessitate amendments.108 With the immediate
concern of bankruptcy pacified, Bear Stearns and JPMorgan executives
met throughout the week of March 17 to discuss merger revisions that
would be more acceptable to Bear’s shareholders and market
speculation.109 By week’s end, no revised agreement had been reached,
and for a third time Bear’s legal team met to discuss the possibility that the
firm would have to file for bankruptcy on Monday, March 24.110 Anxiety
increased among Bear’s creditors that the merger would fall through given
the low offer proposed, with tense negotiations occurring back and forth
between Bear’s and JPMorgan’s legal offices.111 “At one point, J.P.
Morgan threatened to pull financing . . . [and Bear’s] directors talked
briefly about suing J.P. Morgan[,] . . . [b]ut they quickly realized their
position was untenable.”112 Finally, by Monday, March 24, the parties
reached a provisional agreement to amend the original offer.113 Most
importantly, the new merger agreement appealed to investors and market
confidence by increasing the stock transfer rate from $2 to $10, and
obligated JPMorgan to assume the first $1 billion in losses as deducted
from the $30 billion guarantee to be provided by the New York Fed.114
For many, a crisis had been averted, but at what cost?115 By pledging
$29 billion of hard-earned taxpayer money through its discount window to
an investment bank foiled by bad decisions,116 the Fed’s actions set a
108
See JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 33 (describing how market reactions to the original offer
prompted JPMorgan and Bear executives to enter into revised transaction negotiations).
109
Id.
110
See id. at 34 (“[I]f the New York Fed and JPMorgan Chase were unwilling to maintain their
funding of Bear Stearns . . . [Bear] would not be able to open for business on Monday . . . .”).
111
See id. (“[R]epresentatives of Bear Stearns contacted JPMorgan Chase’s counsel . . . to notify
JPMorgan Chase that its proposal, as presently formulated, was not acceptable to the Bear Stearns
board . . . .”).
112
Kelly, supra note 16.
113
See JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 34–35.
114
See id. at 35–36 (outlining the terms of the new merger agreement). “This means that if the
value of the assets [accepted by the Fed] turn out to be less than $29 billion, the [Fed] would suffer a
loss.” Cecchetti, supra note 41, at 18. Since the time the Fed accepted these assets as collateral for the
loan to October of 2008, taxpayers lost approximately $2.2 billion dollars, based on the ongoing
deterioration of mortgage values. Editorial, The Fed Takes a Writedown, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2008, at
A16.
115
Given the ongoing corrosion of key markets, the total loss that will be suffered by taxpayers as
a result of the Bear Stearns bailout remains to be seen. “[I]n October, six months after taking on $29
billion from investment bank Bear Stearns’ loan portfolio, the Fed decided to write down $2 billion of
the holdings.” Jon Hilsenrath, Bernanke’s Fed, Echoing FDR, Pursues Ideas and Action, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 15, 2008, at A2.
116
See Jenkins, supra note 107 (“Opening up its loan window to investment banks, and through
them to their hedge fund clients, [the Fed] has alleviated the fear of fire sales of mortgage assets.”).
For an interesting historical account of the creation and use of the Fed’s discount window, see Anna J.
Schwartz, The Misuse of the Fed’s Discount Window (Apr. 9, 1992), in FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST.
LOUIS REV., Sept./Oct. 1992, at 60–63, available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/
92/09/Misuse_Sep_Oct1992.pdf.

664

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:647

precedent that risky investors who were “too big to fail” would be saved
from their own self-perpetuated demise.117 Soon after the bailout, critics
denigrated the Fed’s actions as uncharacteristic of a capitalist society,118
while others used the event as a catalyst to launch attacks against the
broader financial regulatory system.119 Now that the Fed is willing to use
its resources to save private investment firms whose bankruptcy could
harm the entire economy, what new types of regulation should such
businesses be subject to? “As the Bear Stearns episode illustrates, some of
the modern-day financial institutions that are too big to fail are not
depository institutions that fall under the strict regulatory umbrella that
accompanies membership in the Federal Reserve System.”120 The
remainder of this Note analyzes the legal authority available to the Fed
during the Bear Stearns collapse, why this authority has been criticized as
deficient, and how scholarly review of twenty-first century financial threats
may lead to the revision and modification of twentieth-century financial
regulation.
III. AN “UNUSUAL AND EXIGENT” LENDER OF LAST RESORT
A. Too Big to Fail
“Legally, the Fed can extend virtually unlimited support to our
financial system,”121 and since the 1930s the Fed has had the authority to
issue direct loans to private businesses through its discount window.122
Nonetheless, before the Bear Stearns predicament, the Fed traditionally
reserved discount window loans for those institutions that were subject to
the Fed’s strict supervisory protocol, namely, heavily regulated depository
117
Crittenden & Eckblad, supra note 4; see also LABONTE, supra note 101, at 12 (“Institutions
that are too big to fail are ones that are deemed to be big enough that their failure could create systemic
risk, the risk that the financial system as a whole would cease to function smoothly.”). The problem of
encouraging risky behavior by bailing out failing institutions is commonly referred to as “moral
hazard.” See id. at 11.
118
See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, We’re Not Headed for a Depression, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2008, at
A27 (“The ‘too big to fail’ approach to banks and other companies should be abandoned as new longterm financial policies are developed. Such an approach is inconsistent with a free-market economy.”).
119
See, e.g., Bernanke, Kansas City, supra note 11 (criticizing the regulatory framework of the
American financial system as inefficient for being ambiguous in its legal mandates); see also William
Neikirk et al., Call Grows for Tough Financial Regulation; Candidates, Congress Consider
Intervening in Banking, Markets, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 2008, at C1 (“Political fervor is growing for a
broad re-regulation of America’s financial markets after a major credit crunch pummeled Wall Street
and Main Street, sent the economy sinking and threatened a market meltdown.”).
120
LABONTE, supra note 101, at 12.
121
Altman, supra note 15.
122
See LABONTE, supra note 101, at 3–4 (discussing the use of the Fed’s discount window in the
past). The statutory authority for the Fed’s discount window lending is provided for in section 10(b) of
the Federal Reserve Act, which provides that “[a]ny Federal Reserve bank . . . may make advances to
any member bank on its time or demand notes having maturities of not more than four months and
which are secured to the satisfaction of such Federal Reserve bank.” Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §
347b(a) (2006).
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123

institutions.
In essence, “[i]n exchange for putting up with regulation
from the Fed and requirements over how much capital they can hold,
[commercial] banks have access to the ‘discount window,’ at which they
can borrow emergency cash in exchange for sound collateral.”124
However, despite its seemingly limitless potential to rescue ailing
businesses, the discount window has long been a secondary tool of the Fed
in altering market operations,125 and even those firms which could access
the Fed’s window in the past have rarely done so for a couple of reasons.
First, from the government’s perspective, the Fed has likely been hesitant
to issue loans because each time it does so a precedent is established that
compounds moral hazard, or the tendency of market participants to engage
in risky behavior irrespective of the consequences given the potential for a
public rescue.126 Second, when a private enterprise looks to the Fed’s
discount window for a loan, it usually means the government is the last
resort for the company, which in turn demonstrates weakness to the greater
market.127 Thus, as a corollary of both government and private reluctance,
rarely would one see the full extent of the Fed’s lending power in action.128
But, what happens when one business’s failure threatens the larger
economy the Fed is obligated to protect, as Bear Stearns’s bankruptcy did?
Similarly, how can the Fed respond to a systemic threat from an institution
not subject to its “regulatory regime?” The answer to these questions lies
in a little known provision of the Federal Reserve Act. In such
circumstances, the Fed can call on emergency lending authority to protect
the larger financial system, and in doing so provide liquidity to any
123
See Greg Ip et al., Stronger Steps: Fed Offers Banks Loans to Ease Credit Crisis, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 18, 2007, at A1 (“[T]he discount window’s reach in the current crisis is limited by the fact that
only [commercial] banks can use it, and they aren’t the ones facing the greatest stains. Rather the
strains are being felt by nonbanks . . . .”).
124
Neil Irwin, Fed Leaders Ponder an Expanded Mission; Wall Street Bailout Could Forever
Alter Role of Central Bank, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2008, at A01.
125
See LABONTE, supra note 101, at 4 (“The Fed’s main policy tool shifted from the discount
window to open market operations several decades ago.”).
126
See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Speech at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Financial Markets Conference: Liquidity Provision by the Federal
Reserve (May 13, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
bernanke20080513.htm [hereinafter Bernanke, Atlanta I]. Chairman Bernanke stated:
A central bank that is too quick to act as liquidity provider of last resort risks
inducing moral hazard; specifically, if market participants come to believe that the
Federal Reserve or other central banks will take such measures whenever financial
stress develops, financial institutions and their creditors would have less incentive to
pursue suitable strategies for managing liquidity risk and more incentive to take such
risks.
Id.; see also Cassandra Jones Havard, “Goin’ Round in Circles” . . . and Letting the Bad Loans Win:
When Subprime Lending Fails Borrowers: The Need for Uniform Broker Regulation, 86 NEB. L. REV.
737, 752–54 (2008) (explaining moral hazard in the context of the mortgage crisis).
127
See Ip et al., supra note 123 (“[The discount window] is little used because it generally carries
a stigma, since it is seen as a struggling bank’s last resort.”).
128
Cf. Nelson D. Schwartz, A History of Public Aid During Crises, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, at
A27 (noting government’s past intervention in the private market during periods of financial crisis).
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institution, not just those within its regulatory reach. It is this emergency
authority that gives credence to the Fed’s characterization as “lender of last
resort.”130 And it is precisely this use of the Fed’s emergency authority to
rescue Bear Stearns that has incited reconsideration of the Fed’s regulation
of investment banks—the argument being that if firms can get public
money, they should be subject to heightened public oversight by the
agency lending that money.131
The specific legal provision authorizing emergency lending to private
enterprises is section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.132 That section
provides in pertinent part:
3. Discounts for Individuals, Partnerships, and Corporations.
In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Federal Reserve
Board, by the affirmative vote of not less than five members,
may authorize any Federal reserve bank, during such periods
as the said board may determine, . . . to discount for any
individual, partnership or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills
of exchange when such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange
are indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the
Federal Reserve bank.133
129
See LABONTE, supra note 101, at 1 (“Lending to non-members requires emergency statutory
authority that has not been used in more than 70 years.” (citation omitted)).
130
Id. at 2; see also Frederic S. Mishkin, Gov. of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, Speech at the
Caesarea Forum of the Israel Democracy Institute: Global Financial Turmoil and the World Economy
(July 2, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin20080702a.htm
(“[I]t is critical that the Federal Reserve acts as lender of last resort when financial stability is
threatened . . . .”).
131
See, e.g., Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, Speech at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond’s Credit Market Symposium (Apr. 17, 2008), available at
http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20080417a.htm (“[I]n my view greater regulatory
attention will need to be devoted to the liquidity risk-management policies and practices of major
investment banks.”).
132
Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
133
Id. § 343 (emphasis added). Interestingly, in Bear’s case, “[t]he required number of five
members of the Board of Governors was not present on the day in question. One of them was out of
town and ratified the vote when he returned, but the first loan was already in motion.” Walker F. Todd,
The Bear Stearns Rescue and Emergency Credit for Investment Banks, AIER, Aug. 11, 2008,
http://www.aier.org/research/commentaries/445-the-bear-stearns-rescue-and-emergency-credit-forinvesmtn-banks. The legal authority allowing for votes of less than five members of the Board of
Governors is provided for by section 11(r)(2)(A)(ii)(I)–(IV) of the Federal Reserve Act, which
mandates:
A. Any action that the Board is otherwise authorized to take under Section 13(3)
may be taken upon the unanimous vote of all available members then in office, if:
I. unusual and exigent circumstances exist and the borrower is unable to
secure adequate credit accommodations from other sources;
II. action on the matter is necessary to prevent, correct, or mitigate serious
harm to the economy or the stability of the financial system of the United
States;
III. despite the use of all means available (including all available telephonic,
telegraphic, and other electronic means), the other members of the Board
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Originally enacted in 1932, the law was an outgrowth of the bank
failures of the early twentieth century and has been used in different
contexts over its seventy-seven-year history, albeit never in the same
manner as in the Bear Stearns case.134 Aside from the requirement that five
governors vote to approve a loan under section 13(3), the provision has
few limitations in terms of the amount that can be lent, or the means by
which the Fed can do so. The condition that collateral be offered “to the
satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank,” is contingent upon a plethora of
extrinsic considerations (including systemic risk) that at times may seem
inconsistent.135 For example, some have criticized the Fed for accepting
the collateral pledged by Bear Stearns or American International Group
(“AIG”) under section 13(3),136 while Lehman Bros. (“Lehman”) was
allowed to go into bankruptcy.137 Also, discount window lending is
usually secured through collateral possessing a good credit rating, which
was certainly not the case in the loans made to Bear Stearns.138

have not been able to be contacted on the matter; and
IV. action on the matter is required before the number of Board members
otherwise required to vote on the matter can be contacted through any
available means (including all available telephonic, telegraphic, and other
electronic means) . . . .
Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 248(r) (2006); see also Minutes of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System 2–3 (Mar. 14, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/other/other20080627a1.pdf (documenting the Board’s vote with regard to factors
specified by section 11(r)(2)(A)(ii)).
134
See Fettig, supra note 8, at 15–19, 44–47 (describing the historical evolution of section 13(3));
Fettig, supra note 4, at 34 (providing a concise timeline of the development of section 13(3) from 1932
to present).
135
12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
136
See Press Release, Fed. Reserve (Sept. 16, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/other/20080916a.htm (“The Federal Reserve Board . . . authorized the Federal
Reserve bank of New York to lend up to $85 billion to [AIG] under section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act.”).
137
See Adam Shell et al., No White Knight Emerges to Rescue Lehman Bros., USA TODAY, Sept.
15, 2008, at 1B (“The failure to get a Lehman deal was due largely to the federal government’s refusal
to provide interested buyers such as Barclays with the kind of support that JPMorgan Chase received
when it bought troubled investment bank Bear Stearns in March.”); Sale Possible as Lehman Sits on
Brink, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 11, 2008, at C1 (“Compounding anxiety is that Lehman, unlike smaller rival
Bear Stearns, might not be able to count on a lifeline from the government.”).
138
Technically, Federal Reserve Banks may only provide advances and discounts to individual
institutions when such extensions of credit are “secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve
bank.” Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 343, 347b(a) (2006). For purposes of discount window
lending, the collateral being pledged by borrowers must “meet regulatory standards for sound asset
quality,” meaning that assets held by solvent, yet illiquid institutions, will generally be adequate to
meet the satisfaction standard of the Federal Reserve Act. Federal Reserve Discount Window,
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/cfaq.cfm?hdrID=14&dtlID=89 (last
visited Nov. 16, 2009). However, although MBS and SMBS are nominally acceptable as discount
window collateral, it is hard to see how the toxicity of Bear’s MBS assets would satisfy Federal Bank
officials, especially when one considers the state of Bear’s financial health during the Fed rescue. See
Federal Reserve Discount Window General Information, http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/
discountwindowbook.cfm?hdrID=14&dtlID=43#introduction (last visited Nov. 16, 2009) (noting that
“[t]he financial condition of an institution may be considered” when evaluating whether, and to what
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Nonetheless, section 13(3) was used three times by the Fed in March 2008,
initially as a means of preventing Bear Stearns’s imminent default and
arranging the JPMorgan acquisition, and subsequently to create a new
lending facility specifically for the large institutions the Fed conducts daily
transactions with.139
Interestingly, it is this last use that demonstrates the Fed’s challenges
in responding to emergency situations of a systemic nature. For if the only
means by which the Fed can save institutions—by issuing direct loans—is
the same mechanism scorned by the market as a sign of weakness, troubled
institutions may hesitate to use the discount window during a financial
crisis.140 Thus, to counteract the stigma associated with the discount
window, the Fed created new lending mechanisms—including the Term
Auction Facility, the Term Securities Lending Facility, and the Primary
Dealer Credit Facility—in anticipation of the need for heightened
borrowing, which has since reached astronomical levels.141 Given this
deficiency, “Fed officials believe[] the [current economic] problems
require[] more than what a central bank was designed to do—provide
emergency loans to healthy institutions in tumultuous times.”142 And yet,
stretching the Fed’s loan capacity was not the only uncharacteristic action
taken by the Fed in the Bear Stearns case—an even more controversial
move was the manner in which the Fed brokered the JPMorgan takeover.
B. Sweetening the Deal143
As previously noted, when the Fed issued the $29 billion loan pursuant
to section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to arrange for JPMorgan’s
acquisition of Bear Stearns, the funds were first filtered to JPMorgan then
extent, a Federal Reserve bank will issue extensions of credit through the discount window). Of
course, this issue adds to the controversial nature of the Bear Stearns bailout.
139
See Bernanke, Atlanta I, supra note 126 (detailing use of the Fed’s emergency lending
authority in each circumstance).
140
See LABONTE, supra note 101, at 4–5 (“Ironically, this means that although the Fed
encourages discount window borrowing so that banks can avoid liquidity problems, banks are hesitant
to turn to the Fed because of fears that doing so would spark a crisis of confidence.”).
141
See Cecchetti, supra note 41, at 19–20 (noting that as of May 2008, the Fed had nearly $180
billion worth of loans as compared to a total of $190 million only nine months earlier). There is some
indication that borrowing and lending from the Fed by both commercial and investment banks has
decreased early in 2009—this could be the result of investor pressures seeking bank independence
without government support. See Prabha Natarajan & Brian Blackstone, Mortgage-Bond Purchases
Start Strong—Fed’s Various Efforts to Bolster Markets Are Ballooning Its Balance Sheet, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 9, 2009, at C3 (“Borrowing through the Fed’s discount window by commercial banks . . . fell
about $10 billion [in the first week of January, while] [l]ending through the Fed’s [PDCF] . . . fell [$3
billion] . . . .”).
142
Jon Hilsenrath et al., Crisis Mode: Paulson, Bernanke Strained for Consensus in Bailout,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2008, at A1 (emphasis added).
143
This section focuses primarily on the Fed’s use of emergency lending authority and other legal
tools to arrange the eventual takeover of Bear Stearns by JPMorgan. As such, the discussion focuses
on the legal authority involved in the merger, not other contexts.
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used to secure Bear’s debts and take over Bear’s operations. Aside from
exercising emergency authority to distribute the loan in the first place, the
Fed also had to exempt JPMorgan from another provision of the Federal
Reserve Act, which is designed to prohibit the very type of transaction the
Bear Stearns deal involved.145 The provision in question is section 23A of
the Federal Reserve Act, which provides:
Restrictions on Transactions with Affiliates
1. A member bank and its subsidiaries may engage in a
covered transaction with an affiliate only if:
A. in the case of any affiliate, the aggregate amount
of covered transactions of the member bank and its
subsidiaries will not exceed 10 per centum of the
capital stock and surplus of the member bank; and
B. in the case of all affiliates, the aggregate amount
of covered transactions of the member bank and its
subsidiaries will not exceed 20 per centum of the
capital stock and surplus of the member bank.146
Section 23A is designed to limit the extent of covered transactions,
including loans, extensions of credit, or the purchase of securities, which
member banks,147 such as JPMorgan, enter into with affiliate institutions—
in this case a wholly-owned subsidiary formed solely for the purpose of
acquiring Bear Stearns.148 Additionally, section 23A “limit[s] the ability of

144
See supra Part II.D. JPMorgan actually formed a wholly-owned subsidiary “solely for the
purpose of consummating the merger.” JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 25.
145
See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(1)A–B (2006); Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec’y of the
Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, to Kathryn V. McCulloch, Senior V.P. & Assoc. Gen. Counsel of JPMorgan
Chase & Co. (July 1, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/
federalreserveact/2008/20080701/20080701.pdf (authorizing exemptions from provisions of the
Federal Reserve to allow JPMorgan to finalize the acquisition of Bear Stearns); Letter from Robert de
V. Frierson, Deputy Sec’y of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, to Kathleen A. Juhase, Senior V.P. & Assoc.
Gen. Counsel of JPMorgan Chase & Co. (Aug. 20, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
BOARDDOCS/LegalInt/FederalReserveAct/2007/20070820c/20070820c.pdf
(approving
initial
exemptions from the Federal Reserve Act authorizing JPMorgan to finance Bear’s daily operations).
146
12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(1)A–B. Near identical restrictions apply pursuant to the Federal Reserve
Board’s Regulation W, as codified in 12 C.F.R. § 223.11 (2009) and 12 C.F.R. § 223.12 (2009), which
limit the aggregate amounts of transactions between member banks and single or multiple affiliates.
147
The term “member bank” refers to depository firms which are members of the Federal Reserve
System. See Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates, 67 Fed. Reg. 76,560, 76,560
(Dec. 12, 2002).
148
Under section 23A, “covered transactions,” include “loan[s] or extension[s] of credit to . . .
affiliate[s] . . . [and the] purchase of assets . . . from [affiliates].” 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(7)(A)(C). An
“affiliate” includes “any company that controls the member bank and any other company that is
controlled by the company that controls the member bank.” Id. § 371c(b)(1)(A). When JPMorgan
acquired Bear Stearns, it formed a wholly-owned subsidiary “solely for the purpose of consummating
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a member bank to transfer its Federal subsidy to affiliates,” precluding
non-member banks from accessing the Fed’s safety net.149 The intention of
the law “is to prevent problems at the affiliate from endangering the
[member] bank’s depositors.”150 Exemptions from these restrictions can
only be granted by the Federal Reserve Board when found to be in the
“public interest and consistent with the purposes of” section 23A.151
As section 23A limits the “aggregate amount of covered transactions”
that a member bank and an affiliate may engage in, the statute presented an
impediment for Fed officials seeking to arrange the JPMorgan purchase of
Bear in late March 2008. Specifically, the statute would expressly prohibit
JPMorgan (as a member bank) from taking over Bear, because the $29
billion “extension of credit” that the arrangement involved was a “covered
transaction” exceeding “20 per centum of the capital stock and surplus” of
JPMorgan.152 Thus, if the purchase of Bear was to be consummated as
planned, the transaction would be illegal and void under the Federal
Reserve Act.153 This dilemma necessitated the utilization of an authorized
exemption from the Federal Reserve Board to ensure that Bear’s
bankruptcy could be avoided in a legitimate manner.154
When JPMorgan first agreed to acquire Bear Stearns on March 16,
2008, the Fed granted a temporary (eighteen-month) 23A exemption so
that JPMorgan would be able to “finance the operations of Bear Stearns”
and guarantee its outstanding debts.155 This initial exemption allowed
JPMorgan to enter into transactions with Bear Stearns and its customers in
aggregate amounts of up to fifty percent of JPMorgan’s “capital stock and
surplus for the second quarter of 2008 (approximately $58 billion).”156
Subsequently, three months after the initial temporary exemption was
granted, on July 1, 2008, the Federal Reserve Board again suspended the
application of section 23A, allowing JPMorgan to complete the purchase
the merger,” which would trigger the application of section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act.
JPMorgan, supra note 64, at 25.
149
Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates, 67 Fed. Reg. at 76,560; see also
PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL, FEDERAL REGULATION OF FINANCIAL HOLDING
COMPANIES § 6.05 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining the scope and purposes of sections 23A and 23B of the
Federal Reserve Act).
150
Brian Blackstone, Fed Agrees to Ease Some Rules for J.P. Morgan, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2008,
at A2.
151
12 U.S.C. § 371c(f)(2). The purposes of section 23A have been declared by the Board as
being two-fold: “(i) to protect against a deposit institution suffering losses in transactions with affiliates
and (ii) to limit the ability of a deposit institution to transfer to its affiliates the subsidy arising from the
institution’s access to the Federal safety net.” Letter from Robert deV. Frierson to Kathryn McCulloch,
supra note 145, at 3 (citation omitted).
152
12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(1)(B).
153
Id.
154
See Letter from Robert deV. Frierson to Kathleen Juhase, supra note 145, at 1–5 (granting and
explaining the exemption from section 23A and setting conditions on the authorized transaction).
155
Letter from Robert deV. Frierson to Kathryn McCulloch, supra note 145, at 6.
156
Id.
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of Bear Stearns’s assets for “approximately $44 billion.”
In doing so,
the Fed reduced the original March 16 aggregate ceiling to $5 billion, and
declared the initial exemption void as of October 1, 2008.158
In both instances, the Fed justified its actions in granting 23A
exemptions based on past practices,159 and in allowing JPMorgan to
complete the purchase of Bear Stearns, the Fed argued that the terms of the
acquisition were substantially similar to those that would exist for
“comparable transactions with unaffiliated companies,” as otherwise
required by federal law.160 While these rationales may be valid, it remains
unsettling that the Fed suspended enforcement of section 23A to permit the
very type of transaction the law was enacted to prohibit.161 Most
importantly, concerns surround the potential losses JPMorgan (and in turn
its depositors) were exposed to during the Bear Stearns transactions, a
primary issue that the enactors of section 23A meant to protect against.162
“In effect, [these] 23A exemption[s] signaled the Federal Reserve’s
willingness to allow troubled investment banks to shift their bad assets to
insured commercial banks and thereby expose the Deposit Insurance Fund
and U.S. taxpayers to a heightened risk of loss.”163 Additionally, by
forwarding a federal subsidy through a member bank to Bear Stearns (a
non-member institution) the Fed endorsed a collateralized transaction
inconsistent with the underlying policy of “safe and sound banking
practices,”164 and specifically restricted by the Federal Reserve Act.165
The highly controversial nature of the Fed’s manipulation of its legal
authority in these circumstances has led to internal disputes among
157

Id. at 3.
Id. at 6.
159
See id. at 3 (“The Board routinely has approved exemptions . . . for one-time asset transfers
that are part of a corporate reorganization and that are structured to ensure the quality of the transferred
assets. The Board also has routinely approved exemptions . . . to facilitate the integration of recently
merged companies.” (internal citations omitted)).
160
See id. at 5 (“Section 23B [of the Federal Reserve Act] requires that the [JPMorgan
acquisition] be on terms that are substantially the same, or at least as favorable to [JPMorgan], as those
prevailing at the time for comparable transactions with unaffiliated companies.” (citation omitted)).
Restrictions On Transactions with Affiliates.
1. A member bank and its subsidiaries may engage in any of the transactions
described in paragraph (2) only—
A. on terms and under circumstances, including credit standards, that are
substantially the same, or at least as favorable to such bank or its
subsidiary, as those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions
with or involving other nonaffiliated companies . . . .
12 U.S.C. § 371c-1(a)(1)(A) (2006).
161
See Transaction Between Members Banks and Their Affiliates, 67 Fed. Reg. 76,560, 76,560–
62 (Dec. 12, 2002).
162
See id. at 76,560 (“Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act are important statutory
provisions designed to protect against a depository institution suffering losses in transactions with
affiliates.”).
163
MCCOY, supra note 149.
164
See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(4).
165
See id. § 371c(c)(3).
158
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government officials as to the extent of the Central Bank’s power to
manage financial crises.166 Ideologically, the Fed’s conduct during the
Bear Stearns bailout signals a policy shift at the Central Bank that
embraces government intervention in preventing the failure of private
firms, a strategy unlike the traditional models which allowed for market
correction, limited government involvement, and ultimately private failures
and bankruptcies. In turn, by becoming more involved in preventing the
failure of private firms, the Fed has inherently increased the scope of its
marketplace oversight—a result accomplished indirectly through the
creation of new facilities and mechanisms implemented to protect ailing
institutions. These new facilities, coupled with the modification of existing
tools, have become the foundation for a new Central Bank that is
progressively intervening more deeply into the market, yet limited by legal
authority devised for the twentieth century.
C. The Offspring of Emergency
Early indications of the Fed’s expanding presence in the financial
markets can be traced back to the week leading up to the bailout of Bear
Stearns. Mindful of the stigma attached to discount window borrowing,
the Fed sought to stimulate lending in mid-March 2008 by relying on a
supplementary loan tool initially developed in December 2007, known as
the Term Auction Facility (“TAF”).167 Unlike the typical overnight
lending done through the discount window, the TAF provides loans with
longer maturity terms (such as twenty-eight days),168 and “[t]he TAF
allows the Fed to determine the amount of reserves it wishes to lend out,
based on market conditions.”169 TAF loans can be collateralized using the
same types of assets accepted at the discount window (including MBS),170
but the amounts offered through the TAF “have greatly exceeded discount
window lending.”171
For example, on March 7, 2008, the Fed announced it would increase
the amounts outstanding in the TAF to $100 billion, and declared that the
two auctions to be held in that month would be extended to $50 billion,
166

See Hilsenrath et al., supra note 142 (detailing frequent disagreements between former
Treasury Secretary Paulson and Fed Chairman Bernanke over proper scope of Fed authority to respond
to systemic threats to the economy).
167
See Charles T. Carlstrom & Sarah Wakefield, The Funds Rate, Liquidity, and the Term
Auction Facility, ECON. TRENDS, Dec. 2007, at 5, 6, available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/
trends/2007/1207/ET_dec07.pdf (“One of the major changes for the Federal Reserve [in December
2007] . . . was the institution of a ‘term auction facility’ (TAF) to supplement regular discount window
borrowing.”).
168
LABONTE, supra note 101, at 5.
169
Id.
170
See id. (“Like discount window lending, TAF loans must be fully collateralized with the same
qualifying collateral [accepted at the discount window].”).
171
Id.
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$20 billion more than previously offered in February 2008.172
Additionally, the Fed assumes the risk associated with a decline in the
value of the collateral posted by private institutions in return for TAF
loans, and questions have arisen as to whether this once temporary
program will become permanent following reevaluation, albeit with
reduced auction amounts.173 Because the funds distributed by the Fed
through the TAF reflect market needs and anticipated demand for
assistance, the TAF is a more controlled platform for lending as compared
to the traditional discount window.174 In the fourth quarter of 2008, TAF
lending and term limits had been extended to as much as $150 billion and
eighty-five days respectively175—figures representative of the popularity
(or necessity) of the TAF during the current financial crisis.
Aside from the growing role of the TAF, “[o]n March 11, 2008, the
Fed set up a more expansive securities lending program for the primary
dealers called the Term Securities Lending Facility” (the “TSLF”).176 The
TSLF allows the Fed to promote financial market operations by providing
easy access to liquidity for those institutions the Fed regularly conducts
transactions with and whose financial size and strength are directly related
to the health of the financial system—the primary dealers.177 Lending
through the TSLF can be in amounts of up to $200 billion in Treasury
securities, for terms of twenty-eight days, and collateralized through a wide
range of assets, including illiquid MBS.178 Initially, MBS collateral had to
be AAA-rated; however, the Fed eventually broadened the types of eligible
collateral to include “all investment-grade debt securities,” and changed
TSLF auctions from biweekly to weekly in September 2008.179 The TSLF
allows the largest financial institutions to regularly swap their
unmarketable assets for easily marketable Treasury securities, which “is
172
See Press Release, Fed. Reserve (Mar. 7, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/monetary/20080307a.htm.
173
See LABONTE, supra note 101, at 5.
174
See id. (“Discount window lending is initiated at the behest of the requesting institution—the
Fed has no control over how many requests for loans it receives.”).
175
Press Release, Fed. Reserve (Oct. 6, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/monetary/20081006b.htm.
176
LABONTE, supra note 101, at 6.
177
See id. at 6 (explaining TSLF operations and providing technical definition of primary
dealers); Press Release, Fed. Reserve (Sept. 14, 2008), available at http://federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/monetary/20080914a.htm (explaining how the TSLF stimulates flow of liquidity
between largest financial institutions). For a discussion of the role of primary dealers, see Marco
Arnone & George Iden, Primary Dealers in Government Securities: Policy Issues and Selected
Countries’ Experience 3–10 (IMF Working Paper No. 03/45, 2003), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp0345.pdf.
178
See Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti, The Role of Liquidity in Financial Crisis 6 (Sept. 4, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1268367.
Treasury securities include Treasury notes, bonds, and bills, backed by the Federal Government and, as
such, are very safe investments.
U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Treasury Securities,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/treasuries.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2009).
179
Press Release, Sept. 14, 2008, supra note 177.
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intended to promote liquidity in the financing markets for Treasury and
other collateral” and improve the overall performance of financial
markets.180
Finally, following JPMorgan’s announced acquisition of Bear Stearns
on March 16, 2008, the Fed launched yet another new lending tool
designated the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (“PDCF”), which was
designed to improve access to discount window-type loans to primary
dealers.181 The PDCF was created pursuant to the emergency lending
provisions of section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, and “provides
primary dealers with a liquidity backstop similar to the discount window
for deposit institutions in generally sound financial condition.”182 Because
many primary dealers, such as Bear Stearns, could not previously pledge
their collateral for direct discount window loans from the Fed, the PDCF
seems to have been the result of Fed frustration in attempting to work
within its legal authority in loaning funds to non-member institutions. As
with the TSLF, the PDCF initially required investment-grade securities as
collateral for overnight or short-term loans; however, the Fed has
subsequently broadened the acceptable PDCF collateral to include assets
exchanged in repo markets.183 From its inception, the PDCF seems to have
contributed to growing lending confidence among primary dealers and
their counterparties, yet the very fact that the PDCF has been extended into
2009 suggests that market conditions remain abnormal.184
The Fed’s use of the TAF, TSLF, PDCF, and other facilities185 raises

180

LABONTE, supra note 101, at 6 (citation omitted).
See Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Primary Dealer Credit Facility, http://www.newyorkfed.org/
markets/pdcf.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2009) (“The . . . (PDCF) is an overnight loan facility that will
provide funding to primary dealers in exchange for a specified range of eligible collateral that is
intended to foster the functioning of financial markets more generally.”).
182
Bernanke, Atlanta I, supra note 126.
183
See Press Release, Sept. 14, 2008, supra note 177 (“The collateral eligible to be pledged at the
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) has been broadened to closely match the types of collateral that
can be pledged in the tri-party repo systems of the two major clearing banks.”).
184
See Bernanke, Atlanta I, supra note 126 (discussing improvement in confidence among
primary dealers and their counterparties and noting that despite improvement in confidence, financial
markets “are still far from normal”); Press Release, Fed. Reserve (July 30, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080730a.htm (announcing the Fed’s
extension of the PDCF until January 30, 2009).
185
The Fed has developed numerous facilities, other than the ones previously described, in an
ongoing effort to stimulate liquidity transfers in financial markets and promote confidence between
counterparties. For example, in October 2008, the Fed created the Commercial Paper Funding Facility
(“CPFF”), which provides a “liquidity backstop” to domestic providers of commercial paper by
allowing the Fed to purchase “three-month unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper directly from
eligible issuers.” Press Release, Fed. Reserve (Oct. 7, 2008), available at http://federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/monetary/20081007c.htm. Likewise, in late November 2008, the Fed instituted the
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (“TALF”), which allows the New York Fed to “lend up to
$200 billion on a non-recourse basis to holders of certain AAA-rated ABS backed by newly and
recently originated consumer and small business loans.” Press Release, Fed. Reserve (Nov. 25, 2008),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/20081125a.htm. The TALF is designed to
181
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important questions about the expanding intervention of the federal
government in our free market economy, as well as the threat to economic
independence and innovation that the Fed’s growing presence poses.
Similarly, skepticism as to the tools utilized by the Fed to combat ailing
market operations emphasizes the concern that the Fed’s policy responses
may indirectly promote moral hazard.186 These issues have incited a
consensus that regulatory reform is overdue and will be a major
undertaking of the Obama administration and the 111th Congress.187
IV. INADEQUACIES IMPAIRING INTERVENTION
A. The Call for Regulatory Reform188
Four months after Bear Stearns was saved from bankruptcy, Fed
Chairman Ben Bernanke testified before the House Committee on
Financial Services to “discuss financial regulation and financial
stability.”189 Using Bear Stearns as an example, Bernanke suggested that
the current regulatory framework for the financial system was inadequately
structured to respond to and remedy problems posed by contemporary
investment banks and products.190 In particular, Bernanke explained that
limited oversight of investment banking practices and sophisticated
investment vehicles had contributed to the creation of a financial system
more advanced than the laws that governed it.191 As in Bear Stearns’s
case, private institutions (and the market as a whole) had evolved to the
extent that a single firm’s failure could bring the entire system to its

make it “easier for consumers to borrow money,” thus easing lending markets and stimulating growth.
Deborah Solomon, New Facility Targets Consumer Lending, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 2008, at C1.
186
See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Greater Austin
Chamber of Commerce: Federal Reserve Policies in the Financial Crisis (Dec. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20081201a.htm [hereinafter Bernanke,
Austin] (“[I]ntervening to prevent the failure of a financial firm is counterproductive, because it leads
to erosion of market discipline and creates moral hazard.”).
187
See id. (“In the longer term, the development of a statutory framework for resolving
systemically critical nonbank financial institutions in ways that do not destabilize the financial system
as a whole must be another key priority.”).
188
This section discusses the impetus for reform of the regulatory structure of the financial system
within the narrow realm of the investment banking industry and the expanding role of the Federal
Reserve as a central administrator. Therefore, consideration of broader regulatory reform that may be
appropriate in other contexts (such as the mortgage industry) is beyond the scope of this Note.
189
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, Testimony Before the House
Comm. on Fin. Servs. (July 10, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
testimony/bernanke20080710a.htm [hereinafter Bernanke, Fin. Servs.].
190
See id. (“[I]n light of the Bear Stearns episode, Congress may wish to consider whether new
tools are needed for ensuring an orderly liquidation of a systemically important securities firm that is
on the verge of bankruptcy, together with a more formal process for deciding when to use those
tools.”).
191
See id. (“Congress should consider granting the Federal Reserve explicit oversight authority
for systemically important payment and settlement systems.”).
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knees.
Known as “systemic risk,” the occurrence of this phenomenon
necessarily prompts the intervention of the federal government.194
However, the nature of that intervention has come under intense scrutiny in
the wake of Bear Stearns.195 Specifically, the scope of the Fed’s authority
as lender of last resort during systemic crisis remains obscure in the
context of nonbank institutions that traditionally were not subject to Fed
oversight.196 “The decision to treat Bear Stearns as if it were a commercial
bank appears to have marked a permanent shift in the governance of
financial services firms.”197 Likewise, as Professor Steven Schwarcz of
Duke University School of Law has noted, de facto bailouts of
systemically important institutions facing bankruptcy focus merely on
“symptoms of the disease . . . not on the disease’s underlying cause.”198
Thus, the Fed’s capacity to respond to financial distress appears
constrained by both the lack of a robust supervisory mandate and a limited
number of tools available to protect the nation’s economy.199 For example,
although the Fed can issue emergency loans to nonbank financial
institutions, “such loans must be backed by collateral sufficient to provide
reasonable assurance that they will be repaid; if such collateral is not
available, the Fed cannot lend.”200 And while the Fed “serves as the
umbrella supervisor of all bank holding companies,” nonbank institutions
are generally supervised by other agencies that lack the resources and legal
authority of the Fed.201
Discrepancies between the Central Bank’s status as “umbrella
192
See id. (“[T]he stability of the broader financial system requires key payment and settlement
systems to operate smoothly under stress to effectively manage counterparty risk.”).
193
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198 (2008) (“A common factor in
the various definitions of systemic risk is that a trigger event, such as an economic shock or
institutional failure, causes a chain of bad economic consequences—sometimes referred to as a domino
effect.”); see also Olivier De Bandt & Philipp Hartmann, Systemic Risk: A Survey 10–11 (Eur. Cent.
Bank, Working Paper No. 35, 2000), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp035.pdf.
Systemic risk as a focus of regulation is discussed infra Part V.A.
194
See Mishkin, supra note 130 (explaining the necessity of the central bank as lender of last
resort during systemic financial crises).
195
See Bernanke, Kansas City, supra note 11 (“[I]n the rare circumstances in which the
impending or actual failure of an institution imposes substantial systemic risks, the standard procedures
for resolving institutions may be inadequate.”).
196
See Bernanke, Fin. Servs., supra note 189 (“[U]nder current arrangements, the SEC’s
oversight of the holding companies of the major investment banks is based on a voluntary agreement
between the SEC and those firms.”).
197
David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance in the Ruins, 122 HARV. L. REV. 696, 740 (2008) (reviewing
Curtis J. Milhaupt & Katharina Pistor, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL
ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD (2008)).
198
Steven L. Schwarcz, Markets, Systemic Risk, and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 61 SMU L.
REV. 209, 214 (2008).
199
See, e.g., Bernanke, FDIC, supra note 9.
200
Bernanke, Austin, supra note 186.
201
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Allied Social Science Association
Annual Meeting (Jan. 5, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
bernanke20070105a.htm.
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supervisor” and its restricted oversight of investment and securities firms is
largely the result of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (the
“GLBA”).202 In passing the GLBA, “Congress was cognizant of the fact
that functional regulation for securities [subsidiaries of depository
institutions], when combined with the traditional oversight powers of the
[Fed], had the potential to create added regulatory burdens for bank and
financial holding companies.”203 Therefore, the GLBA directed the Fed
“to limit the focus and scope of [its] examinations” into nonbank
institutions (i.e., investment banks) subject to alternative regulatory
schemes, and “forego examinations [of these firms] in lieu of reviewing
examination reports by the [SEC].”204 Unfortunately, this division of
responsibility severely curtails the Fed’s ability to anticipate systemic risks
posed by investment banks and financial institutions, especially when the
SEC does not live up to its obligations. As Professor Patricia McCoy of
the University of Connecticut School of Law explains, “[the GLBA]
essentially envisions systemic risk as risk that is confined to one sector (for
example, the banking sector as opposed to the securities sector). As
financial services become more intricate and interdependent, however, that
assumption [along with the efficacy of patchwork regulation] must be
questioned.”205 Indeed, Bear’s primary regulator, the SEC, “played almost
no role” in Bear’s rescue, suggesting that the Fed’s principal regulation of
commercial banks may be obsolete and too narrow-minded given today’s
reality.206
The regulatory deficiencies that seem to impair the Fed’s ability to
effectively respond to systemic threats are even more pronounced
considering the fact that “the Fed is the only agency that has the power to
serve as a liquidity provider of last resort, a power that has proved critical
in financial crises throughout history.”207 Because the Fed has come to
assume the risk associated with loans to previously unregulated
institutions, officials contend that increased supervision of such firms by
the Fed is only reasonable and in keeping with the Fed’s obligation to

202

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809, 6821–6827 (1999).
PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL, BANK AND THRIFT SUPERVISION
§ 2.04(1)(a)(ii) (2009).
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
See Skeel, supra note 197, at 735–36; see also Kristen French, Wall Street Turf Wars: SEC
Versus Fed, July 24, 2008, http://registeredrep.com/regulatory/sec_versus_fed_0724/index.html
(“There has been some speculation that the Federal Reserve would begin to regulate investment banks
much in the same way that it regulates commercial banks today, requiring them to compute capital
requirements and maintain liquidity levels on a consolidated basis, and discouraging certain kinds of
financial risk-taking.”).
207
Bernanke, FDIC, supra note 9.
203
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promote overall financial stability.
Of course, “[w]ith the Fed bearing
apex responsibility for U.S. financial stability, it is reasonable to ask
whether it enjoys sufficiently broad oversight authorities.”209 Given its
“macroeconomic objectives” of “maximum sustainable employment and
price stability,”210 Fed leaders have stressed the importance of enhanced
oversight authority as a necessity for accomplishing its directives.211
Ideally, providing the Fed with greater supervisory powers would limit the
need to issue emergency loans in the future, as the Central Bank could use
policy initiatives to deter investment operations that lead to systemic risk.
In this way, the financial system as a whole, and the American taxpayer,
would be better protected from future instances of market disruption
caused by irresponsible trade practices. If the Fed were better able to
anticipate failures among individual firms or markets, it would be less
likely that gaps in the regulatory structure would afflict the broader
economy.212
These issues have led some officials to argue that a unified system of
financial regulation under the direction of the Fed would make the most
sense in light of the oversight failures of the past year.213 In fact, the
heterogeneous makeup of the existing regulatory system has been
criticized as unduly redundant, inefficient, and archaic, and a liability to
the security of the future financial industry.214 Even before the onset of the
current crisis, empirical evidence suggested that those countries that had a
208
See Irwin, supra note 124 (“[Former] Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. said that if
investment banks are given permanent access to the Fed’s emergency funds, they should have the same
kind of supervision that the Fed requires for conventional banks.”).
209
Vir Bhatia, supra note 17, at 17 (emphasis omitted).
210
Kevin Warsh, Governor of the Bd. of the Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the New York State
Economics Association’s 60th Annual Conference: Financial Stability and the Federal Reserve (Oct. 5,
2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/warsh20071005a.htm.
211
See Bernanke, FDIC, supra note 9 (“[H]olding the Fed more formally accountable for
promoting financial stability makes sense only if the institution’s powers are consistent with its
responsibilities.”); Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Exchequer Club
Luncheon (Feb. 21, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
kohn20070221a.htm (“The Federal Reserve’s activities as a bank supervisor provide us with important
and sometimes critical information . . . . Thus, I want to take this opportunity to emphasize and
reinforce the case for central bank involvement in bank supervision.”).
212
See Browne, supra note 17, at 385–87 (discussing how gaps in the regulatory structure of the
financial industry impair the nation’s global competitiveness).
213
See Scannell, supra note 13 (“‘What makes more sense [than the current approach] is to have a
unified system of financial-services regulation.’” (quoting Harvey Pitt, former SEC Chairman)).
214
See Norman D. Slonaker, The Department of the Treasury Blueprint for a Modernized
Financial Structure, 1708 PRAC. L. INST. 955, 958 (2008).
The current regulatory system of separate agencies across functional lines (banking,
insurance, securities and futures) has resulted in:
i.
No single regulator with all the information and authority to monitor
systemic risk and coordinate action throughout the financial system
ii. Jurisdictional disputes among the agencies
iii. Regulatory redundancies
iv. Inefficiency and loss of U.S. competitive advantage
Id.
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unified supervisory and monetary program enjoyed fewer bank failures in
the 1980s and 1990s than countries that separated such responsibilities
among different agencies.215 Together with other statutory reforms
designed to streamline government oversight of nonbank institutions and
complex securities,216 proponents of enhanced Fed supervision within the
financial services industry argue that the Central Bank is the most
economic platform from which to shape the future regulatory structure.217
Currently, Fed officials are attempting to clarify the Central Bank’s
existing supervisory protocol in an effort to increase awareness as to the
Fed’s oversight abilities.218 It remains to be seen whether the results of this
internal review will reinforce arguments for the revision of financial
regulation. Needless to say, as the market continues to adjust to the barren
landscape of the post-housing bubble, commentators have observed that
the lack of a clear regulatory structure is hindering economic recovery.219
Still, others doubt whether increased regulation is the answer to recurring
economic crises, and even public officials have warned that rushing to
regulation is imprudent.220
B. Private Skepticism
Amidst the seemingly ubiquitous appeals for tougher regulation,
215

See Joseph G. Haubrich, Combining Bank Supervision and Monetary Policy, FED. RESERVE
BANK OF CLEVELAND, Nov. 1996, http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Commentary/1996/1196.
htm.
216
For example, the Treasury Department has suggested that the SEC and CFTC merge to afford
consolidated oversight and regulation of the securities and futures markets. See DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 11 (2008),
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf.
Additionally, Chairman
Bernanke has suggested that a new regulatory regime be developed specifically for nonbank
institutions. See Bernanke, Kansas City, supra note 11 (“A statutory resolution regime for nonbanks,
besides reducing uncertainty, would also limit moral hazard by allowing the government to resolve
failing firms in a way that is orderly but also wipes out equity holders and haircuts some creditors,
analogous to what happens when a commercial bank fails.”).
217
See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 216, at 146–56 (detailing how the Fed’s current
responsibilities and authority complement the expanded protocol suggested by the Treasury
Department).
218
See David L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Comm.
on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs (June 5, 2008), available at http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
testimony/kohn20080605a.htm (“The Federal Reserve is nearing completion of enhancements to its
supervisory guidance to clarify [its] role as consolidated supervisor of bank and financial holding
companies . . . . The updated guidance is primarily intended to provide greater clarification to [its] own
examination staff.”).
219
See Tyler Cowen, Was an Old Bailout a Bad Precedent?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2008, at BU5
(“Regulatory uncertainty is stifling the ability of financial markets to engineer at least a partial
recovery.”).
220
See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at New York University Law School:
Financial Regulation and the Invisible Hand (Apr. 11, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070411a.htm (“[T]he benefits of regulation come with direct and
indirect costs. Direct costs include those arising from compliance with a thicket of complicated
rules . . . . Indirect costs include reductions in innovation or competition that can result from overly
restrictive regulations.”).
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skeptics have voiced their dissent in an attempt to explain why this most
recent economic catastrophe should cause lawmakers to pause before
instituting a mass overhaul of the existing regulatory structure.
Critics of such a legislative renovation, both in the United States and
abroad, argue that more regulation may simply be ineffective in preventing
future crises given the incredibly complex nature of today’s financial
markets.221 For example, Professor Tyler Cowen of George Mason
University has explained that “regulators will never be in a position to
accurately evaluate . . . many of the most important market
transactions.”222 Because of the intricate web of international finance,
which involves highly sophisticated players and trillions of dollars,
government regulators lack the resources to use reform as a means to
prevent disaster.223 Instead, “the real issue is setting strong regulatory
priorities to prevent outright fraud and to encourage market transparency,
given that government scrutiny will never be universal or even close to
it.”224 Similarly, using government to restrain un-regulated financial
sectors after they have wreaked havoc on the system may not be the best
guide for controlling future threats.225 As some commentators have
pointed out, the debate over the future of regulation has arisen in the smog
of disaster, and a complete reconsideration of traditional models of reform
may be necessary.226
Additionally, the possibility that reform will create a slippery slope of
government abuses and outright favoritism has made headlines in the
United Kingdom, where revised banking policies have been criticized as
allowing the public sector to “cherry-pick assets and transfer them to a
private sector buyer.”227 Interestingly, the United Kingdom delegates the
responsibility of bank and financial services supervision to a single agency,
the Financial Services Authority (“FSA”).228 As a central hub of financial
oversight, the FSA draws on expansive regulatory powers to influence and
observe market operations, and functions independently of the Bank of
221
See Cowen, supra note 2, at BU7 (“[I]t’s not obvious that the less regulated financial sector
performed any worse than the highly regulated housing and bank mortgage lending sectors, including,
of course, the government-sponsored mortgaged agencies.”).
222
Id.
223
See id.
224
Id.
225
See id.
226
See Adrian Blundell-Wignall & Paul Atkinson, The Sub-Prime Crisis: Causal Distortions and
Regulatory Reform, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL TURMOIL OF 2007 AND 2008 55, 66 (Paul
Bloxham & Christopher Kent eds., 2008), available at http://www.rba.gov.au/PublicationsAnd
Research/Conferences/2008/Blundell-Wignall_Atkinson.pdf (“There needs to be some new thinking
about reform of the regulatory and policy-making paradigms for the longer run.”).
227
Philip Aldrick, Banking Reforms Will Jeopardise Financial Industry, Say Lawyers, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 4, 2008, at 3 (quoting Bob Penn, Regulatory Partner, Allen & Overy).
228
See About the FSA, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/What/index.shtml (last visited Nov.
16, 2009) (providing links to details on the scope, objectives, and structure of the FSA).
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229

England.
This separation of central banking and banking supervision is
emphasized by critics who reject the expanding role of the Fed as a
financial administrator over nonbanks.230 Those who endorse the United
Kingdom’s regulatory approach contend that increased independence of
financial regulators allows flexibility in governance, which in turn
promotes efficient use of resources and generally more effective
policies.231 By adopting a “principles-based” methodology of supervision
that encourages voluntary compliance by private institutions, the FSA has
been commended for promoting market discipline.232 Furthermore, by
removing supervisory responsibilities from the purview of a central bank,
and thereby reducing its oversight authority, some scholars have argued
that the risk that a conflict of interest would impede the Fed’s ability to
impose monetary restraint out of concern for banks is largely reduced if not
eliminated, by the FSA paradigm.233 With countries such as Korea, Japan,
India, and South Africa moving toward systems that mirror those of the
United Kingdom,234 questions will soon arise as to how the United States
should proceed and what the future role of the Fed should be.
Finally, even public officials have cautioned that added regulation
cannot threaten the ability of market participants to develop innovative
business models or investment products.235 Although the existing
framework does not seem to promote American competitiveness in key
global markets,236 any new regulatory system for the financial industry
should not be “counterproductive” by encouraging parties to conduct their
229

Id.
See C.A.E. Goodhart, The Organisational Structure of Banking Supervision 8–23 (Fin.
Stability Inst. Occasional Papers No. 1, 2000), available at http://www.bis.org/fsi/fsipapers01.pdf
(addressing arguments that have been made for the continued separation between central banks and
banking supervision).
231
See Harvey L. Pitt, Bringing Financial Services Regulation into the Twenty-First Century, 25
YALE J. ON REG. 315, 321–23 (discussing the benefits of the FSA model of supervision as contrasted
with that of the SEC); see also Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s Financial Markets Conference: Regulation and Financial Innovation (May
15, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070515a.htm
[hereinafter Bernanke, Atlanta II] (describing the FSA’s “[p]rinciples-based” supervisory approach as
concentrating government resources and attention to those “firms, markets, or instruments in proportion
to the perceived risks to the FSA’s regulatory objectives”).
232
See Pitt, supra note 231, at 321–23 (describing how the FSA’s approach is more efficient than
traditional models employed by American organizations); John H. Walsh, Institution-Based Financial
Regulation: A Third Paradigm, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 381, 383–87 (2008) (discussing the mechanics of
“principles-based” regulation as adopted by the FSA and some American organizations, and the praise
and criticism “principles-based” regulation has garnered).
233
See Goodhart, supra note 230, at 20–23 (discussing how separating supervision from central
banking works to reduce the occurrence of conflicts of interest with regard to the creation of monetary
policy).
234
See id. at 6–7.
235
See Kohn, supra note 211 (advising that regulations which attempt to anticipate and control all
possible systemic threats may unduly restrict market growth).
236
See Browne, supra note 17, at 393–410 (discussing how U.S. firms are losing influence in
various markets as a result of current regulatory deficiencies).
230
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business overseas.
With the major U.S. investment banks now all
subsidiaries of bank holding companies, some argue that the Fed no longer
needs enhanced supervisory powers over nonbanks to successfully monitor
market threats. However, as discussed in Part V, existing oversight
restrictions continue to limit the Fed’s capacity to adopt a prophylactic risk
management policy.238 Obviously, striking the right balance between
laissez-faire and new financial regulation is a complicated issue that
remains a key focus of those at the Fed and on Capitol Hill. Therefore, the
remainder of this Note draws on existing scholarly work devoted to the
challenge of improving banking and financial system oversight with the
goal of increasing dialogue as to the proper role of the Fed in such future
regulatory schemes.
V. GOING FORWARD: THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT BANK REGULATION
A. An Attempt at Reconciliation
It goes without saying that the goal of regulators in implementing any
new framework of investment banking and financial system oversight
should be to focus on the most important threats to economic stability
facing our country. While some may argue that those threats range from
unbridled greed to government incompetence, the key concern of
lawmakers should be the contemporary nature of systemic risk.239 As the
current crisis illustrates, systemic risk has developed into a cross-sector
cancer, capable of emerging within the securities realm and spreading to
the banking and credit sectors. This development stresses the jurisdictional
boundaries of federal agencies, reducing the capacity of the Fed or similar
regulators to respond to systemic risks in accordance with existing legal
authority.240 Because “[f]ederal banking agencies are specifically barred
from examining registered investment company subsidiaries,” the Fed
must rely on inconsistent piecemeal examinations of these firms, which
themselves are subject to “stringent restrictions.”241 For example, as the
237
See Neikirk et al., supra note 119, at C1 (“Those who oppose too many new federal
regulations on Wall Street investment banking firms fear such a move could be highly
counterproductive and drive more financial transactions overseas to London, Hong Kong, or other
spots.”).
238
See MCCOY, supra note 203, § 12.04(1) (describing how the existing scheme of banking
regulation is duplicative and inefficient).
239
See Robert W. Hahn & Peter Passell, The Rush to Reregulate, AEI ON THE ISSUES, Aug. 20,
2008, http://www.aei.org/issue/28495 (“The most easily justifiable rationale for [government]
intervention is the potential for damage to those not directly involved—for example, people who lose
their savings in bank runs when credit markets freeze.”).
240
MCCOY, supra note 203, § 12.04(1)(a)(ii); see also Schwarcz, supra note 193, at 198–204
(discussing how systemic risks faced by individual institutions and markets should not be considered in
isolation when defining systemic risk as a focus of regulation).
241
MCCOY, supra note 203, § 12.04(1)(a)(ii).
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GLBA mandates, the Fed may only examine “functionally regulated
subsidiaries” (including investment banks) in three instances: (1) where the
Fed has “reasonable cause to believe” the activities of the subsidiary “pose
a material risk to an affiliated depository institution[;]” (2) where the Fed
“reasonably determines” an examination is needed to assess the propriety
of the internal monitoring and control systems of the subsidiary; and (3)
where the Fed has “reasonable cause to believe” a subsidiary is in violation
of federal law within its jurisdiction.242 These provisions effectively
preclude the Fed from undertaking routine examinations of investment
banks, thereby increasing the potential for risks to go unnoticed.
Additionally, the GLBA specifically prohibits federal banking agencies
from inspecting or examining any “registered investment company that is
not a bank holding company or a savings and loan company.”243 And,
although “the FDIC has full authority to examine any affiliate of a
depository institution[,]” it can only do so when “necessary to disclose
fully the relationship between the two companies and the effect of that
relationship on the depository institution’s condition.”244
Loopholes such as these inhibit the effective management of risks
within the investment banking and financial sectors, impairing the Fed’s
ability to protect the commercial banking industry. Given the potential for
systemic threats to devastate various markets and the real economy,
enhancing the Fed’s capabilities at anticipating and reacting to systemic
risks within the financial and investment contexts is a necessity. This
argument is supported by the fact that major domestic investment banks
have now become subsidiaries of bank holding companies, thereby
augmenting the importance of a consistent and unified structure of
supervision.245 With the protection of individual depositors now directly
intertwined with the stability of investment companies previously
operating in relative isolation, systemic risk is no longer an abstract
anomaly confined to the plush offices of Wall Street executives and
investors—it is now a concern of all American taxpayers.
Therefore, as the primary guardian of banking stability, the Fed ought
to be given greater powers to supervise investment banks and other
financial companies whose fate can now affect the lives of millions of
Americans. As Professor McCoy suggests, “where an investment
company is located in a subsidiary of a bank or thrift, consolidating safety
and soundness examinations in the deposit institution’s primary federal
242

Id.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1820a(a) (2006).
244
MCCOY, supra note 203, § 12.04(1)(a)(ii) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
245
See Bernanke, Atlanta II, supra note 231 (“Rather than addressing specific institutions or
instruments in isolation, regulators should begin by identifying their objectives and then address the
implications of the broad range of financial innovations for those objectives. By returning to the
basics, we can increase the coherence, consistency, and effectives of the regulatory framework.”).
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banking supervisor would make for better informed examinations.”246 Of
course, this is not to say that systemic risk should become a scapegoat for
irresponsible reform measures which do more harm to the country’s
economic prowess than protect it. Because future systemic risks may be
considered unavoidable occurrences of free market ideology and even
human behavior, regulation alone will be insufficient in preventing all
future occurrences of systemic threats.247 Instead, a “private initiative that
will complement official oversight in encouraging [responsible] industrywide practices” is an essential feature of any future regulatory agenda.248
Nonetheless, “market discipline often needs to be buttressed by
government oversight,”249 and the Fed should be granted greater powers
over investment banks with respect to reporting, regulation, examinations,
capital requirements, and enforcement.
1. Reporting to the Fed
Imposing tougher reporting and disclosure requirements on investment
banks and their managers has the additional benefit of improving a firm’s
internal culture of risk appreciation and understanding. In other words, if
investment banks are required to disclose quarterly or semi-annual reviews
of balance-sheet status or investment outlooks, irresponsible risk taking
will become less of a clandestine affliction.250 Utilizing existing reporting
models for commercial banks would prove useful in this regard,251 as
would repealing provisions of the GLBA which inhibit the Fed’s
examination of “functionally regulated subsidiaries.”252 No longer should
the Fed be responsible for supervising the risks posed by investment banks
“with one hand tied behind its back,” and investment banks and their
managers should be held responsible for filing accurate “quarterly reports
of condition” directly with the Federal Reserve, instead of the SEC, CFTC,
246

MCCOY, supra note 203, § 12.04(1)(a)(ii).
See Alan L. Beller, Containing Systemic Risk: The Road to Reform—The Report of the
CRMPG III, Aug. 6, 2008—Excerpts, 1704 PRAC. L. INST. 19, 39 (2008) (“The fact that financial
excess fundamentally grows out of human behavior is a sobering reality . . . . However, official
oversight is not a substitute for the effective management of financial institutions, which is, and should
remain, a private-sector function.”).
248
Id.
249
Bernanke, Atlanta II, supra note 231.
250
See id. (discussing how effective disclosures can limit the occurrence of reckless trade
practices); see also MCCOY, supra note 203, § 12.03(2) (“Periodic reports of condition by individual
institutions to regulators are the lifeblood of banking supervision and an important diagnostic tool for
monitoring the financial health of banks and thrifts.”).
251
See MCCOY, supra note 203, § 12.03(2)–(3) (describing the types of reports and data that
insured institutions must file with federal regulators).
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Id. § 12.03(1)–(2) (“Because of its enormous exposure to losses . . . the federal government
requires every insured depository institution . . . to file detailed financial reports on a regular basis.”
(emphasis added)). Professor McCoy describes how the GLBA sought to streamline reporting
requirements for companies subject to oversight by multiple regulators, but may have “swayed too far”
in doing so—a concern made all the more apparent given the well publicized lapses of the SEC as of
late. Id. § 12.03(2).
247

2009]

CRISIS COMPOUNDED BY CONSTRAINT

685

253

or other functional regulators.
Additionally, legislation aimed at
creating new reporting standards may want to consider the value of
independent auditing, public disclosures, and mandatory penalties for
“false reports or late filings.”254 Finally, Chief Risk Officers or
comparable executives within investment banks should develop a working
relationship with Fed examiners that fosters enhanced transparency and
promotes greater market discipline.255
2. Regulation
Granting the Fed greater regulatory powers over investment banks will
necessarily conflict with the jurisdictional authority of the SEC. However,
given the critical role played by the lender of last resort during systemic
crisis, the Fed should be granted “the authority to set expectations and
require corrective actions as warranted in cases in which firms’ actions
have potential implications for financial stability.”256 The Central Bank
should also have the ability to establish prospective regulations designed to
limit the need for emergency discount window loans. For example, by
instituting a clear process by which the Fed can manage the anticipated
insolvency of an investment bank, the likelihood that a disorderly failure
will instill fear in the markets is reduced, as is the potential for banks runs
and contagion.257 Additionally, as Chairman Bernanke has argued, the
Fed’s oversight of “systemically important payment and settlement
systems” must be explicitly delineated so that the Fed can ensure that these
systems remain fluid in crisis situations.258 As a benefit to the firms,
greater regulation should, in turn, allow investment banks greater access to
the Fed’s “discount . . . window under nonemergency circumstances.”259
But, such access must not be seen as an excuse to ignore market
discipline.260 The SEC should develop policies intended to assist the Fed
in overseeing the operations of investment banks, yet “consolidated
supervision” of these firms is more efficient than the process currently in
253
See id. (“The Federal Reserve Board and its fellow agencies should not be dependent . . . on
the SEC . . . for reports on interaffiliate transactions and other ‘subtle hazards’ that could endanger a
bank or thrift’s safety and soundness.”).
254
Id. § 12.03(2)–12.03(4).
255
See FIN. STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON ENHANCING
MARKET & INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE 22–26 (2008), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.
org/publications/r_0804.pdf (recommending that “[r]isk disclosures by market participants” be
increased to improve transparency within the financial markets).
256
Bernanke, FDIC, supra note 9.
257
See Bernanke, Austin, supra note 186 (discussing the benefits of the FDIC’s ability to manage
the insolvency of commercial banks and how a similar system for securities firms may be needed).
258
Bernanke, Fin. Servs., supra note 189.
259
Kim Dixon & Karey Wutkowski, Financial Regulation Reform—But Not Paulson’s—Likely in
2009, INS. J., Aug. 25, 2008, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2008/08/25/93050.htm.
260
See Bernanke, FDIC, supra note 9 (“[A]ttention should be paid to the risk that market
participants might incorrectly view the Fed as a source of unconditional support for financial
institutions and markets, which could lead to an unacceptable reduction in market discipline.”).
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place.
Therefore, the Fed’s supervisory role should be extended to
include oversight of investment banking and financial services firms,
which are now subsidiaries of depository institutions. New regulations
necessary to protect economic stability should be adopted with the
understanding that flexibility and some risk taking are vital to fostering
growth and innovation.262
3. Examinations
Creating a detailed examination process for the Fed to use in
overseeing financial services firms is critical. In keeping with its new role
as consolidated supervisor of investment banks, the Fed’s examination
authority should be enhanced to mirror that which exists for traditional
For example, “[s]afety and soundness
depository institutions.263
examinations” which generally assess a commercial bank’s infrastructure
in key areas such as “solvency,” “management,” and “information
technology,” ought to be implemented with new standards for investment
banks.264 Additionally, “compliance examinations” which focus on a
firm’s compliance with applicable “consumer and investor protection
laws” should be instituted to ensure that investment banks maintain
legitimate market operations.265 A rating system that appraises vital
elements of a firm’s operations may be beneficial, and examinations
should be conducted regularly so as to identify potential threats or risks
within single or multiple institutions.266 To accommodate the concerns of
the private sector, an “appeals process” similar to that used for depository
institutions would be useful in checking government discretion and
improving the accuracy of examinations.267 “To fulfill its responsibilities,
the Fed would also need to have the ability to look at financial firms as a
whole, much as the [Fed does] today when [it] exercise[s] [its] umbrella
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See id. (“[R]eforms in the oversight of these firms must recognize the distinctive features of
investment banking and take care neither to unduly inhibit efficiency and innovation nor to induce a
migration of risk-taking activities to institutions that are less regulated or beyond our borders.”).
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See MCCOY, supra note 203, § 12.04(1)(b)–(4) (discussing in detail the examination process
of “Federal bank examiners” over depository institutions).
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Id. § 12.04(1)(b).
Safety and soundness examinations monitor the solvency of insured institutions,
evaluate management and follow up on areas of needed improvement. Safety and
soundness examinations include full-scope examinations, specialty examinations in
areas such as information technology and trust operations, and special examinations
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Id. (internal citations omitted).
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guidelines under the “Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System”).
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authority over financial holding companies . . . .”
Increased
examinations of investment banks will provide Fed officials with
information necessary to enhance the efficacy of the government’s
containment of systemic risk, reducing threats to other sectors of the
economy and protecting individual consumers. When appropriate, the
results of examinations should be published to allow the interested public
the opportunity to review the state of an individual firm’s business
model.269 Of course, such disclosures must be mindful of the threat of
bank runs that co-exists with the public’s interpretation of a company’s
financial health.270
4. Capital Requirements
Another crucial factor in improving the Fed’s ability to contain
systemic risk is ensuring that investment banks have the necessary capital
resources to prevent the liquidity crisis Bear Stearns and other institutions
have recently faced. Leverage ratios must be controlled to guard against
the possibility of future government bailouts and reduce the occurrence of
moral hazard.271 Fortunately, proposals such as those announced in Pillar 1
of the Basel II Capital Accord provide detailed and practical frameworks
that the Fed can utilize in determining the best method for setting capital
reserve minimums for investment banks.272 Because depositors now have
an interest in the solvency of securities firms, leverage ratios must remain
conservative enough to protect against bankruptcy and illiquidity
quagmires. For those depository institutions that have now become the
parent company of investment bank subsidiaries, the Fed must make
certain that the vast resources of a depository institution do not become
indirect incentives for investment banks to assume more debt than the
subsidiary can afford. Thus, to provide the most protection for depositors,
reserve standards for investment bank subsidiaries should remain
independent of those of the parent holding company. Also, sections 23A
and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act must remain key safeguards in
restricting the types and extent of transactions that depository institutions
can engage in with their affiliates and counterparties.273 At no time should
268
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See MCCOY, supra note 203, § 12.04(4) (describing how public disclosure of past examination
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271
See Morris & Shin, supra note 17, at 21–26 (using case analysis to describe why future
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See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT & CAPITAL STANDARDS 12–14 (2005), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107b.
pdf (outlining the process for determining minimum capital requirements as a basis for improving
banking regulation).
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a “covered transaction” imperil the security and liquidity of any depositor’s
account,274 and regularly conducted examinations should stress the
consistency of an investment bank’s capitalization to confirm that the
subsidiaries’ leverage does not affect the health of the depository
institution.
5. Enforcement
How the Fed goes about enforcing its oversight authority over
investment banks is open to vast commentary. Nonetheless, the existing
structure of formal and informal275 enforcement mechanisms for
commercial institutions may again provide useful guidance in this respect.
For example, aside from the “examination process[es],” “board resolutions
and commitment letters,” and “supervisory directives,” which comprise the
bulk of informal bank supervision, the Fed should also be allowed to
impose “cease-and-desist orders,” officer and director suspension (and
removal or prohibition), and civil monetary penalties against securities
firms when federal regulatory compliance is lacking, or the investment
bank’s practices deviate from “generally accepted standards of prudent
operation.”276 Additionally, lawmakers may want to consider the potential
benefits afforded by “agency adjudication”277 and public disclosure278 in
insuring that investment banks maintain acceptable investment and risk
portfolios. However, it is vital that a proper balance between regulatory
enforcement and market independence be maintained. In this regard,
enforcement mechanisms may in some circumstances be subject to judicial
review,279 with top Fed officials periodically assessing enforcement
standards to confirm that regulation is not stifling market progression and
economic growth.
At the risk of oversimplifying the problems inherent in creating a new
regulatory framework for investment banks, the preceding discussion has
offered several suggestions for improvement of the Fed’s oversight
authority in the financial services industry. Clearly, the topics focused on
do not exist exclusively from one another or in isolation of other
considerations which are relevant to this issue. For instance, complications
will soon arise when one factors in the important issues of private sector
reluctance, global central bank policy coordination,280 and securities274
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specific regulation.
Nevertheless, each contribution to this topic
encourages the reform that is essential to economic recovery.
B. The Current Reality
The global economic crisis that continues to wreak havoc in the United
States and other countries is as far-reaching as it is complex. For nearly
two years, the world has witnessed the destruction of financial
powerhouses, the deterioration of the stock and credit markets, and
repeated attempts by political leaders to rejuvenate the economy through
unprecedented government programs. Unfortunately, the crisis
demonstrates how regulatory inadequacies have allowed irresponsible and
reckless trade practices to create a worldwide catastrophe not seen since
the 1930s. “For years, too many Wall Street executives made imprudent
and dangerous decisions, seeking profits with too little regard for risk, too
little regulatory scrutiny, and too little accountability.”282 The excesses of
greed and carelessness have been seen by all Americans who have suffered
from the exploitation of investment products by financial firms and their
managers. Moreover, vast sums of public money have been taken from the
coffers of taxpayers in an effort to rescue the financial system from those
who have profited from its unrestrained manipulation. As this disaster best
illustrates, a robust and dynamic twenty-first century economy cannot
survive in the midst of such abuses.
Because of the diversity of problems posed by the current recession,
investment banking and financial services regulatory reform is likely to be
a drawn-out process that may take years to complete. However, the
existing regulatory structure is incapable of providing the type of oversight
and supervision that is required of modern financial markets and the
enterprises involved therein. Consequently, new policies are an inevitable
and indispensable feature of stable financial growth, new investor
confidence, and economic recovery in general.
VI. CONCLUSION
The story of Bear Stearns is in many ways a microcosm for the larger
economic calamity that began in late 2007 and continues to this day. As
Wall Street’s fifth largest investment bank, Bear used aggressive tactics
20081214a.htm (discussing the importance and challenges of ongoing policy coordination between
central banks across the globe).
281
For example, any new regulations imposed on investment banks must be implemented in a
way that will complement the controls adopted for CDS, ABS, and other complex securities and
derivative products.
282
Pres. Barack Obama, Speech at George Mason University: American Recovery and
Reinvestment (Jan. 8, 2009), available at http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/text-obama-speecheconomy/story.aspx?guid=%7B4C5C66C9-2BD5-4870-8FE2-02BC6B75F3E7%7D&dist=msr_1
(emphasis added).
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rooted in unchecked speculation to acquire and sell exotic financial
products whose value was uncertain and largely dependent on the
continued success of the housing market. In the absence of strict oversight,
Bear sold complex derivative investments that pushed the firm’s debt
beyond the point backed by readily available liquid assets. Then, when the
housing bubble burst, Bear’s infrastructure collapsed under the weight of
its irresponsible balance sheet, bringing the securities firm to the brink of
bankruptcy.
Constrained by antiquated laws providing only a limited number of
options to choose from, the Central Bank intervened to prevent Bear
Stearns’s disorderly failure, fearing that the firm’s downfall would touch
off an uncontrollable domino effect among similar institutions. In doing
so, the Fed committed billions of dollars of taxpayer money in an effort to
prevent a larger disaster, the implications of which could not be fully
predicted. Such actions raised important questions regarding the legality
of the Fed’s brokerage of the sale of Bear Stearns to JPMorgan, especially
the risk posed to commercial depositors that had been a focus of federal
laws aimed at precluding similar transactions. And despite the bailout,
investment banks continued to fail, while others drastically changed their
business structures to survive the loss of investor confidence that continues
to shake the foundation of Wall Street itself.
Now, in the aftermath of the devastation of America’s investment
banking industry, the call for regulatory reform has been widespread and
intense. As the past two years demonstrate, the federal government must
be granted broader authority within the financial services industry to
effectively manage systemic risks in a way that reduces the likelihood of
future bailouts and reckless market practices. Still, this reform must also
preserve the competitiveness of key sectors of the United States economy.
Given the Fed’s assumed role as steward over much of the existing
investment banking landscape, it should be given the supervisory powers
needed to fulfill its newfound responsibilities.
If one considers the development of the current economic crisis from a
macro level, the comparisons to be drawn from the Bear Stearns incident
are apparent. First, the demise of the housing market and the onset of the
mortgage crisis precipitated the failure (or near failure) of some of Wall
Street’s largest institutions. In turn, these events threatened the vitality of
the entire economy. Second, the federal government took unprecedented
actions to bail out the financial system, injecting up to $700 billion of
public money into the ailing credit and securities markets. But the
economy continued its recessionary fall, with investors fleeing,
unemployment rising, and growth stagnating. Finally, in the wake of this
catastrophe, the Obama administration and Congress have promised
sweeping regulatory programs designed to combat the failings of existing
frameworks, while also strengthening economic resilience and progression.
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In this way, both Bear and the larger crisis have followed the course from
failure, to bailout, to calls for reform.

